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Abstract
We develop methods and employ similar sample restrictions to analyse differences in intergen-
erational earnings mobility across the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden. We examine earnings mobility among pairs of fathers and sons as well
as fathers and daughters using both mobility matrices and regression and correlation coeffi-
cients. Our results suggest that all countries exhibit substantial earnings persistence across
generations, but with statistically significant differences across countries. Mobility is lower in
the U.S. than in the U.K., where it is lower again compared to the Nordic countries. Persis-
tence is greatest in the tails of the distributions and tends to be particularly high in the upper
tails: though in the U.S. this is reversed with a particularly high likelihood that sons of the
poorest fathers will remain in the lowest earnings quintile. This is a challenge to the popu-
lar notion of ’American exceptionalism’. The U.S. also differs from the Nordic countries in
its very low likelihood that sons of the highest earners will show downward ’long-distance’
mobility into the lowest earnings quintile. In this, the U.K. is more similar to the U.S..
JEL Codes: J62, C23
Key words: Intergenerational mobility, earnings inequality, long-run earnings
1 Introduction
The extent to which socio-economic outcomes depend on family background is an issue of
great interest to both social scientists and policy makers. One way of assessing the extent
of social mobility in a country is to compare it with other countries. Sociological studies of
class and occupation have for decades provided insights into cross-country differences and
similarities in intergenerational mobility. During the past 10-15 years, economists have also
contributed to this field of research, in large part on the basis of the maturing panel datasets
that allow researchers to observe members of two consecutive generations at economically
active ages. Examples include Couch & Dunn (1997), Björklund & Jäntti (1997), and surveys
that include results from several countries, such as Solon (1999, 2002) and the papers in Corak
(2004c). Together, these contributions provide evidence from several countries, using a variety
of statistical approaches to the analysis of intergenerational mobility. The evidence suggests
that, while the ordering of other countries varies, the United States and the United Kingdom
tend to have higher rates of intergenerational persistence, and, hence, less socio-economic
mobility than other countries. Precise statements about the ranking are typically hampered by
large standard errors on the estimated parameters of interest.
International comparisons of intergenerational income mobility are intricate for at least
two reasons. First, most persistence measures are highly sensitive towards exact data defi-
nitions and data collection procedures. To our knowledge, there have been few attempts to
compare mobility across several countries based on a standardised methodological approach
and comparable datasets.1 Patterns in existing meta-analyses, based on comparisons of inde-
pendently developed results from different countries, may therefore largely reflect differences
in data structures, measurement and statistical approach rather than genuine differences in in-
tergenerational mobility. Comparability problems motivate the adjustments made by Corak
(2004b) in a recent literature survey. Second, there exists no single objective summary-
measure of intergenerational mobility. With a few exceptions (for example, Corak & Heisz
(1999), Eide & Showalter (1999), Checchi et al. (1999) or Couch & Lillard (2004)) the liter-
ature focuses almost entirely on either the elasticity of child income with respect to parental
income, or the correlation of (the natural logarithm of) parent-child permanent income. Apart
from being very sensitive towards the treatment of extreme observations, such summary-
measures may conceal interesting differences in mobility patterns across the whole range of
the bivariate income distribution, both within and across countries.
The present paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature in three important respects.
First, we have made substantive efforts to provide standardised intergenerational samples for
six different countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States). Although we cannot claim to have eliminated all possible cross-country vari-
ations in the data structures, we are confident that the resultant datasets provide a better basis
1The only such studies we are aware of are Björklund & Jäntti (1997), Couch & Dunn (1997), Grawe (2004)
and Blanden (2005).
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for comparison of the countries involved than do meta-analyses which compare estimates
from different independent studies. Second, we have sought to provide a more informative
and comprehensive picture of intergenerational mobility than that embodied in simple sum-
mary measures such as income correlation coefficients and elasticities. In particular, we re-
port quintile group income mobility matrices for all six countries, and a set of supplementary
summary measures based on various properties of these matrices. Finally, we equip all the
mobility statistics reported in the paper, including the elements of the mobility matrices, with
confidence intervals, based on bootstrap techniques. These confidence intervals and the boot-
strap distributions that underlie them provide the basis for inference regarding cross-country
differences.
Most of the summary measures reported in this paper lend support to the previously re-
ported finding that the Nordic countries are characterised by significantly higher intergener-
ational income mobility than the United States. Interestingly, however, the United Kingdom
bears a closer resemblance to the Nordic countries than to the United States. Our main find-
ing, however, is that most of the cross-country difference that has been reported in income
correlations and elasticities is confined to rather limited parts of the bivariate earnings distri-
bution. For example, the difference between the U.K. and the Nordic countries is to a large
extent caused by the low downwards male mobility from the very top to the bottom end of the
earnings distribution in the U.K.. An even lower long-distance mobility from the top is found
for the U.S.. However, what distinguishes the pattern of male intergenerational mobility in the
U.S. most from that of all the other countries in our study is the low upwards mobility for sons
from low income families in the United States.
Comparative studies of socio-economic mobility have long challenged the notion of “Amer-
ican exceptionalism”, a term that was invoked by Tocqueville and Marx to describe what was
then thought of as exceptionally hight rates of social mobility in the United States.2 The so-
ciological approaches, such as that based on class mobility, suggest that the United States is
fairly unexceptional (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992a,b, 2002). The economics literature, based
on correlation or regression coefficients, suggests that the United States may, indeed, be excep-
tional, but not in having more mobility, but in having less (Solon 2002), a finding our results
support. Our study, based on a more flexible approach to mobility, uncovers evidence that,
while middle-class mobility may be quite similar across countries, the United States has more
low-income persistence and less upward mobility than the other countries we study. Thus, we
argue that “American exceptionalism” in intergenerational income mobility may need to be
viewed in a new light.
2See Björklund & Jäntti (e.g. 2000) for a discussion in the context of international comparisons of mobility.
For an empirical historical perspective, see Ferrie (2005) and also Long & Ferrie (2005)
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2 Data and descriptive statistics
We exploit data for Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United
States. These countries are included in part because suitable microdata from them are avail-
able to us. They also allow for a robust comparison of the U.S. with several other countries,
including one with presumably more laissez-faire social policies and the Nordic countries
with their more extensive welfare states. The guiding principle for the choice of datasets and
sample construction for each of these countries has been the objective of maximal similarity
across countries in the kind of data required for the analysis of intergenerational earnings mo-
bility. The key data requirements include earnings information on parents and offspring in
their respective prime ages.
Our starting point for data selection is the observation that for our purposes the best data-
set for the U.K. is the National Child Development Study (NCDS). This study sampled all
offspring born during a particular week in 1958. The sample persons and their families have
been surveyed several times since they were first drawn. The most recent sweeps are those
for 1991 and 1999, providing information on the offspring’s gross earnings at ages 33 and 41
years. These observations meet the criterion of observing earnings of prime age offspring.
Furthermore, the 1974 sweep of the NCDS, i.e., at age 16 of the offspring, provides infor-
mation on the family income of offspring’s parents. We note that although we have only one
observation on parental income, the point in time occurs when fathers were typically of prime
age. The average age of fathers in our sample is 46 in 1974.
That income information for both generations is at a reasonably similar age and that this
age is typically around the individuals’ mid 30s or early 40s (in the case of offspring) or mid
40s (for fathers) is valuable to us. As several studies have shown (see, for example, Grawe
2005, Reville 1995), estimates of intergenerational earnings elasticities are highly sensitive to
the age at which sons’ earnings are observed, increasing substantially in age. The elasticities
initially increase and then decrease with father’s age. Haider & Solon (2005) demonstrate that
this can be explained by the strong life-cycle pattern in the correlation between current and
lifetime earnings. Björklund (1993), for example, found this correlation to be zero or negative
for workers less than 25 years of age and to rise to about 0.8 only for workers over the age
of 32-33. Haider & Solon (2005) show that, contrary to the assumption of the conventional
errors-in-variables model, the slope coefficient from the regression of current log earnings
on the log of lifetime earnings does not, in general, equal unity but, instead, is likely to be
less than one early in a career. This is because an early-career comparison understates the
true gap in career earnings if, as is typically the case, workers with higher lifetime earnings
experience higher earnings growth rates. Their empirical results indicate that earnings should
be measured at around age 40 in order for current earnings to be a reasonable proxy for life-
time earnings. In their application of the same approach to more extensive Swedish data,
Böhlmark & Lindquist (2005) obtain similar results.
In order to generate country-specific data which are comparable across countries, we have
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sought to mimic as closely as possible the NCDS data for the other countries in our study.
This means that we have compiled data on offspring born as close as possible to 1958 and for
whom appropriate information on fathers is available. Ideally, we would like to have measures
of lifetime income for both generations for all our countries. In the absence of this, we try to
replicate for our other countries the U.K. design of observing offspring’s earnings twice, at
ages 33 and 41. For parental income, we have only the one observation for the U.K. – when
the offspring was aged 16 – and we restrict ourselves to this in the main results section also
for our other countries. Our sensitivity analysis allows us to explore the consequences of this
restriction in other countries.
For Norway, we have access to information on the complete 1958 birth cohort, together
with the father’s earnings measured in 1974. The offspring’s earnings are measured in 1992
and 1999. For Sweden, we use data on a single birth cohort: that of 1962. For this cohort, we
have father’s earnings measured in 1975 and offspring’s in 1996 and 1999. For Denmark, the
data refer to offspring born in the period 1958-1960 and on whom we use earnings information
for 1998 and 2000. The fathers’ earnings are measured in 1980: when the offspring are a
little older than is typically the case for the other countries. For Finland, offspring are also
born between 1958 and 1960 and their earnings are observed in 1993 and 2000. The father’s
earnings are observed in 1975. The note to Table 1 summarises the information on the years
at which earnings are observed for each country.
For the United States, two data sources are available, namely the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We choose to work
primarily with NLSY rather than the PSID essentially because of sample size considerations.
By using only small subsamples from the PSID, elasticity estimates are very much dependent
on the samples. E.g. Chadwick (2002) and Lee & Solon (2004) use small samples from the
PSID and show how elasticity estimates fluctuate over years and subsamples and are connected
with large standard errors. They conclude that more efficient use of data based on all available
birth cohorts in the PSID gives more reliable results. In our case it is impossible to use PSID
efficiently, since the data sets have to resemble NCDS. In one of the few attempts to use
comparable datasets, Levine & Mazumder (2002) find that the standard errors for the elasticity
estimates are smaller when using NLSY than when using PSID. Consequently, they warn
researchers not to rely on results based on small samples from the PSID. In our case, the
standard errors in the estimates based on the PSID become large and convey information of
little use for comparisons with estimates from other countries.3
Thus, for the U.S., we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for offspring
born between 1957 and 1964. The offspring’s earnings are taken from the 1996 and 2002 sur-
veys and refer to wages and salary income during the previous calendar year (1995 and 2001).
Parental income refers to 1978. The data are described more fully in the appendix. While we
feel that we have succeeded in constructing data for reasonably comparable cohorts across the
different countries on which we subsequently conduct a common standardised statistic analy-
3Results based on the PSID have been compiled by us and are available upon request.
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sis, inevitably there are data differences across countries. These are discussed in more detail
below. One difference for the U.S. is that in the NLSY we have data on family income rather
than on only father’s income.
For all countries, we include only father-child pairs where the father is between 35 and 64
years at age 16 of the offspring (that is, in 1974 for the U.K. data).4 The father is thus in the
U.K. data born between 1910 and 1939.5 We inflate parental income to year 2000 values, then
regress the natural log of earnings in the single outcome year on a quartic polynomial in age
and record the residual from that regression. We then predict what their earnings would have
been had they been 40 years old, add to this their estimated residual and take the anti-log. This
is the income measure used in our analyses for offspring.6
Much has been made of the fact that the magnitude of such least-squares coefficients ap-
pear very sensitive to exact sample definitions and, in particular, the treatment of zeros (see
Couch & Lillard 1998). We have chosen not to arbitrarily assign a number where one is not
defined (i.e., to the natural logarithm of 0, which some choose to define to be 1). Instead,
we use in our main analysis only those pairs of offspring and fathers that contribute at least
one non-zero income observation and estimate for our main results our regression and corre-
lation coefficients using natural logarithms. We also show mobility matrices including zero
observations.
We note that the same father may appear several times. For instance, if a father has two
sons and two daughters in the appropriate age range, he occurs twice in the father-son sample
and twice in the father-daughter sample when the mobility tables and regression and correla-
tion coefficients are estimated. However, we include each father only once in constructing the
fathers’ earnings distribution and in the age correction. Thus, the mobility table is constructed
based on the actual distributions of father’s earnings or earnings. One implication of this is
that the marginal distribution of fathers is not exactly (.20, .20, .20, .20, .20) as it would be if
there was exactly one father per child.
Starting with fathers (Panel A in Table 1), we see that our Danish fathers tend to be older
than the rest, with the others being on average in the range of 44 and 47 when observed
with earnings. It should be borne in mind, when looking at the percentiles, that they refer
to somewhat different income concepts. The U.K. numbers are net weekly income from all
sources (annualised) and the U.S. number refer to family income. The Nordic countries in
turn include individual earnings only. Even with that caveat, the estimated 20th, 40th, 60th
and 80th earnings percentiles (i.e., quintiles 1-4) suggest that the U.S. was a lot richer than the
4Thus, e.g., if we use social families, the father is observed as living with his son in 1974. Further, there is
some variation as to the calendar year in which the father-son relationship is established across countries. There
is also variation across countries in which two years are chosen for child outcomes, the prototype being the U.K.
with 1991 and 1999. The two years are, however, a few years apart and are all between 1991 and 2001.
5The lower age limit is to avoid teen dads (and may be unnecessary) but the upper age limit has to do with
labour market age in 1974.
6We predict at age 40 to make offspring approximately and on average the same age as their father. Most of
the sample of fathers is older than this, though. Making them the same age seems useful for the same reason as
for the offspring, it makes the examination of the limits more cogent.
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other countries in the early to mid 1970s.
The estimated percentile ratios, p90/p10, perhaps quite surprisingly suggest that Finland
had in the early 1970s the highest level of inequality of these nations, followed by the U.S.,
Denmark and Norway, with the U.K. having the lowest.7 Note that the parental income in the
U.K. are grouped and net of taxes, which accounts in part for their smaller dispersion. While
the ordering for the p90/p50, p10/p50 and the Gini coefficients shuffles countries around to
some extent, the U.K. is always the country with least inequality, followed by Norway. The
U.S. is always in 2nd or third place and Finland in 1st or 2nd.
For offspring, we also inflate the earnings to the year 2000 values, then regress the log
of annual earnings on a year indicator and save the average of the OLS residual across the
years for each individual. We add to this the estimated time effect in the later year (1999
for the U.K.) and take the anti-log. While excluded from the main analyses, an offspring with
zero earnings in both years is assigned zero earnings. We have also conducted the analyses that
include zero earning fathers and sons, the results of which are included in the appendix.8 After
adding in zeros, as appropriate, we estimate the quintiles of the newly defined age-corrected
distribution of earnings and classify cases as belonging to one of five earnings quintile groups.
Panels B and C in Table 1 show selected descriptives for the offspring. Here also we
have some variation in the income concept. For the Nordic countries and the U.S., we use
annual earnings. In the U.K., we use gross weekly pay (annualised) and thus do not include
variation due to differences in weeks worked. We focus here on the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th
percentiles of earnings, measured as the average across the two years, as well as summary
inequality indices. The differences in the real earnings across the distribution are less than
was the case in the fathers’ generation.
Among the offspring, the inequality orderings look more like what we would expect from
modern studies of income and earnings differentials, taking into account the variation in in-
come concepts. For men, the U.S. has most inequality as measured by the p90/p10, p90/p50
rations and the Gini coefficient. Denmark, Finland and Norway tend to be close together and
the U.K. has least degree of inequality. The exception to U.S.’ position is the p10/p50 ra-
tio, where the U.S. is ranked 3rd. For women, the U.S. always exhibits the most inequality
whereas Denmark tends to exhibit the least. The rank of other countries varies by measure.
7The strikingly high level of Finnish earnings inequality is consistent with other historical evidence, which
suggests that income inequality in the early 1970s were at historically high levels. It is also in part accounted for
by the fact that we impose no other restrictions, such as working full time full year. If we do that, the level of
earnings inequality reduces to more familiar levels.
8We add the estimated year effect so that the earnings quintiles have an immediate interpretation in the
local currency. Technically, this only shifts the limits, but it makes for a more cogent discussion of the limits
themselves. We convert all numbers to international, constant price dollars (although we still use the within-
country-within-generation quintiles to delimit the classes).
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics – fathers and offspring
A. Fathers
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden UK USNLSY
Age 50
[50,50]
47
[47,47]
48
[48,48]
43
[42,43]
46
[46,46]
46
[46,46]
Percentiles
20 21030
[20931,21146]
10797
[10292,11064]
18247
[18128,18323]
15994
[15955,16031]
19311
[19016,19653]
37105
[36039,38680]
40 27077
[27034,27117]
16967
[16747,17133]
23174
[23105,23252]
18836
[18800,18873]
23578
[23417,23788]
52822
[52804,52804]
60 31766
[31708,31817]
21208
[20844,21230]
27273
[27194,27340]
21982
[21932,22038]
27566
[27431,27664]
66028
[65944,67265]
80 39717
[39624,39816]
28535
[27938,29095]
34152
[34042,34261]
28037
[27930,28145]
32923
[32741,33295]
92439
[87996,93278]
Inequality
90/10 4.996
[4.901,5.093]
6.875
[6.221,7.527]
3.406
[3.359,3.449]
2.641
[2.623,2.660]
2.274
[2.226,2.338]
4.231
[3.802,4.575]
90/50 1.670
[1.666,1.675]
2.245
[2.117,2.321]
1.680
[1.671,1.690]
1.737
[1.728,1.744]
1.502
[1.471,1.523]
1.913
[1.783,2.000]
10/50 0.334
[0.328,0.341]
0.327
[0.308,0.349]
0.493
[0.489,0.499]
0.658
[0.654,0.662]
0.661
[0.645,0.674]
0.452
[0.433,0.480]
Gini 0.285
[0.284,0.286]
0.340
[0.334,0.345]
0.243
[0.242,0.244]
0.241
[0.239,0.242]
0.180
[0.177,0.183]
0.307
[0.296,0.317]
B. Sons
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden UK USNLSY
Percentiles
20 23930
[23765,24105]
11716
[11337,12120]
22560
[22313,22774]
14471
[14254,14680]
22664
[22204,23271]
20905
[19461,22095]
40 30278
[30188,30363]
18996
[18719,19306]
28872
[28719,29012]
20830
[20718,20941]
29529
[28926,30129]
31534
[30259,32861]
60 35647
[35541,35764]
24568
[24176,24961]
34216
[34034,34396]
24564
[24471,24671]
37163
[36335,37950]
42045
[40243,43934]
80 45459
[45224,45665]
31733
[31226,32243]
43377
[43088,43678]
30445
[30263,30600]
47667
[46695,48747]
60218
[57461,63540]
Inequality
90/10 4.296
[4.192,4.392]
6.127
[5.703,6.691]
3.567
[3.484,3.646]
4.341
[4.217,4.463]
3.231
[3.073,3.384]
5.952
[5.325,6.722]
90/50 1.706
[1.696,1.715]
1.780
[1.745,1.820]
1.705
[1.689,1.720]
1.623
[1.610,1.637]
1.831
[1.761,1.899]
2.217
[2.085,2.389]
10/50 0.397
[0.389,0.407]
0.290
[0.266,0.310]
0.478
[0.468,0.488]
0.374
[0.364,0.384]
0.567
[0.550,0.585]
0.373
[0.336,0.404]
Gini 0.279
[0.277,0.281]
0.344
[0.336,0.351]
0.271
[0.265,0.276]
0.276
[0.273,0.280]
0.276
[0.264,0.288]
0.396
[0.380,0.413]
n 78131 5797 27254 32564 2205 1805
C. Daughters
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden UK USNLSY
Percentiles
20 16324
[16168,16490]
7871
[7540,8184]
10583
[10412,10738]
8959
[8831,9063]
7234
[6895,7617]
9145
[7930,10189]
40 23374
[23306,23448]
13489
[13126,13777]
16487
[16348,16637]
13409
[13316,13502]
11887
[11427,12334]
17554
[16205,18595]
60 27521
[27446,27599]
17775
[17529,18043]
21522
[21391,21655]
16730
[16643,16826]
17673
[16923,18429]
26060
[25075,27331]
80 32943
[32851,33055]
22048
[21820,22340]
27038
[26875,27195]
20753
[20630,20857]
26354
[25361,27166]
39601
[37787,41658]
Inequality
90/10 3.965
[3.876,4.052]
6.243
[5.780,6.790]
5.009
[4.849,5.165]
4.593
[4.468,4.730]
7.347
[6.705,7.958]
12.884
[10.393,15.650]
90/50 1.488
[1.481,1.494]
1.663
[1.623,1.706]
1.652
[1.637,1.665]
1.626
[1.613,1.638]
2.333
[2.225,2.442]
2.308
[2.154,2.496]
10/50 0.375
[0.367,0.383]
0.266
[0.246,0.286]
0.330
[0.320,0.340]
0.354
[0.344,0.364]
0.318
[0.296,0.345]
0.179
[0.147,0.218]
Gini 0.253
[0.252,0.255]
0.323
[0.315,0.331]
0.298
[0.295,0.301]
0.284
[0.281,0.287]
0.382
[0.370,0.396]
0.440
[0.419,0.459]
n 73803 5450 25574 30901 2348 1614
Note: Earnings have been adjusted to 2000 prices and converted to 2000 international U.S. dollars using OECD’s
PPP exchange rate for that year. Fathers are between 35-64 years of age and earnings are measured in Denmark
in 1980, Finland in 1975, Norway in 1974, Sweden in 1975, U.K. in 1974 and the U.S. in 1978. The sons and
daughters are born in Denmark: 1958-1960, Finland: 1958-60, Norway: 1958, Sweden: 1962, U.K.: 1958 and
the U.S.: 1957-1964 and their earnings are measured in Denmark: 1998 and 2000, Finland: 1995 and 2000,
Norway: 1992 and 1999, Sweden: 1996 and 1999, U.K.: 1991 and 1999, U.S.: 1995 and 2001. The youngest
offspring are 30 and oldest 42 in the years earnings are measured. The numbers in brackets below the point
estimates show the bias corrected 95 percent bootstrap confidence interval.
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3 Methods
Persistence versus mobility
Many important insights into the comparative patterns of intergenerational inequality have
been gained from studying the intergenerational elasticity (i.e., the regression coefficient in a
log-log regression) or the correlation coefficient in the log incomes of the offspring and the
parent(s). These two both have their benefits. The correlation coefficient is a measure of asso-
ciation between variables whose dispersion has been standardized and can be useful when the
marginal distribution has changed substantially across time. The elasticity of offspring income
with respect to that of the father is a well understood measure of conditional expectation in
log incomes.
The elasticity is, however, a measure of average persistence of income rather than of mo-
bility. In other words, the regression coefficient on father’s log (permanent) earnings tells us
how closely related, on average, an offspring’s economic status is to that of his or her parent.
It is quite possible for two countries to have highly similar average peristence, but for one to
have substantially more mobility around that average persistence. The elasticity can thus be
the same, but arguably the country with a greater residual variation – that is, variability around
the average persistence – is the one with greater mobility. Moreover, two countries with the
same regression slope may have quite different, and varying, conditional variances around that
slope. For instance, a country with a “bulge” in the variance at low levels of fathers’ earnings,
that is, a pear-shaped bivariate distribution, will exhibit relatively more mobility at the low end
of the distribution than will a country with a constant conditional variance.
One approach is to examine both the regression coefficients and residual variances. We
use a more direct method of comparison, however, based on quintile group mobility matri-
ces. In allowing for fairly general patterns of mobility, mobility matrices offer the additional
advantage of allowing for asymmetric patterns – more mobility at the top than at the bottom,
say. Other approaches, such as non-parametric bivariate density estimates, would in principle
be available (see e.g. Bowles & Gintis 2002). Since these typically require a large number of
observations to work well and some of our data sets are fairly small, these are not an option
here.
Choice of summary mobility index
To facilitate comparisons across countries, we compute summary measures of mobility based
on the estimated quintile group mobility matrices. Bartholomew (1982), Checchi et al. (1999)
and Fields & Ok (1999) review mobility indices based on mobility / transition matrices. The
choice of measures is a non-trivial task, but we rely on fairly standard indices. Formally, let
the (k×k) mobility matrix P have elements pi j for which ∑ j pi j ≡ 1. Ideally, a mobility index
M(P) ∈ [0,1] should satisfy 0 ≡ M(Ik) < M(P) < M(PM) < 1, where PM is the “perfect
mobility” matrix. Not all measures suggested in the literature satisfy the bounds of 0 and
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1. The “perfect mobility” matrix could be taken to be M(pi j ≡ 1/k∀i, j), i.e., the mobility
matrix with independence of origin and destination (each destination is equally likely). This
is the usual standard of comparison, and the one that we use here. Alternatively, it could be
one matrix in the class for which pii ≡ 0 (in which nobody remains in their class of origin).
This class would have maximal mobility if for every row (save the first and the last), the
probabilities in the cells that are in the first and last columns sum to one and are zero elsewhere
(in the first and last columns the anti-diagonal elements would both be one).
The trace index, MT is based on the sum of the off-the-main-diagonal elements of a mo-
bility matrix:
MT =
k− tr(P)
k−1 . (1)
One index, ML is based on the second largest eigenvalue λ2 of the mobility matrix:
ML = 1−|λ2(P)| (2)
which takes the value of one if the mobility matrix assigns equal probability to all transitions
(or, more generally, if each row is equal to the limiting distribution [which in our case is 0.2
in each cell]). The index MF is based on a direct comparison of the limiting distribution and
the mobility matrix, defined to be
MF = 1−
1
k2 ∑i ∑j
∣∣∣∣
pi j
k−1 −1
∣∣∣∣. (3)
Finally, one index suggested by Bartholomew (1982) measures the expected number of classes
to be moved across:
MB = ∑
i
∑
j
pi j pi|i− j|. (4)
Statistical inference
We include for all our estimates the estimated confidence intervals. Since we estimate some
quite complex statistics, such as (5× 5) mobility matrices and summary measures based on
these, and even for simpler cases rely on fairly complex standardisation procedures, we rely
throughout the paper on bootstrap estimates of the sampling variability of our statistics (see
Davison & Hinkley 1997).
Some of the statistics we study, such as the correlation coefficient or the intergenerational
elasticity, have well-known sampling distributions. Others do not. For instance, in estimating
the elements in the mobility matrix, there is some extra variation that is due to the fact that
we estimate quintiles of the two income distributions simultaneously with the conditional
probabilities that constitute the mobility matrix. As these estimators have complex or even
unknown sampling distributions, we have chosen to use a simple re-sampling technique, the
bootstrap, to simulate the sampling distributions of all statistics. We re-sample even those
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statistics which have known distributions as we may be interested in the joint distribution of
two statistics, such as the regression coefficient and the trace index. Bootstrapping provides
us with a multivariate sampling distribution.
To assess the extent to which sampling errors account for the ordering of countries, we first
check if the confidence intervals for a specific parameter in two different countries overlap.9
If not, we take this as evidence that the statistic in the two countries are different. In the cases
where the confidence intervals overlap for a substantively interesting comparison, performing
a proper statistical test on the difference would require us to pool the microdata. However,
our Nordic data sets are by domestic law and by the practice of the Nordic statistical agencies
not allowed to travel and not all pairwise comparisons can be done. That means that advanced
methods of testing for whether a statistic estimated in two different samples is different or not,
such as permutation tests or re-sampling from the two samples directly, are not available to us.
Instead, we rely on a procedure for approximating the two-sample test that we outline below.
Whatever statistical tests we do, we must rely on the bootstrap distributions for our statis-
tics to do them. The estimators in different countries are independent of each other. We could,
in principle, assume asymptotic normality for both of the estimators and use a standard t-test
on the difference between two estimated means. Many of the statistics we have estimated are
restricted to the unit interval and whether or not asymptotic normality is appropriate likely
varies across countries, as our sample sizes are very different.
The strategy we choose instead is as follows – see Figure 1. Suppose we estimate the
value of a statistic θ ∈ Θ in two countries, indexed by 1 and 2, by θ̂ j ≡ x¯ j and we observe
that x¯1 < x¯2. The null hypothesis is that θ1 = θ2. The problem is that the equality θ1 = θ2
can occur in a range of values of Θ – indeed, it could in the most general case take any value
on the real line. We must take into account the range of values in assessing the probability of
observing the difference we do, conditional on the null of equality holding. Denoting by z the
values that our estimator can have, we take as our alternative hypothesis the opposite of what
we observe, namely that x¯1 ≥ z∩ x¯2 < z. We must then take into account the joint likelihood
of x¯1 ≥ z∩ x¯2 < z at all possible values of z.
The estimators apply to two different country data sets and are independent. From their
independence it follows that the likelihood of the event that x¯1 ≥ z∩ x¯2 < z is the product of
Pr(x1 ≥ z)×Pr(x2 < z) (see Panel A in Figure 1). An evaluation of this probability over all
values of z is in a loose sense a test of the null hypothesis that the two parameters are equal
against the one-sided alternative that θ2 < θ1. We report this probability that the ordering of
the countries would be the opposite of what we observe as the p-value in our result tables.
Panel B in Figure 1 shows how we proceed to evaluate the likelihood of observing x¯1 ≥
z∩ x¯2 < z for all possible values of z. The figure shows the x1,x2 plane. All points below the
45 degree line, where equal z = x1 = x2 are such that x2 < x1. We must therefore evaluate the
likelihood of observing combinations of x1,x2 in that region. Any point x1,x2 is associated
9There are several ways to construct a bootstrap confidence interval. We use the empirical percentiles cor-
rected for bias.
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Figure 1 Statistical inference for independently distributed statistics
A. The univariate sampling distributions
f (x1)
f (x2)
Pr(x1 ≥ z)
Pr(x2 < z)
x¯1
x¯2z
x
B. The bivariate sampling distribution
x1
x2
x′1
x′2
x2 = x1(= z)
R x1
−∞ fX2(x2)dx2
R
∞
−∞ FX2(x1) fX1(x1)dx1fX1,X2(x′1,x′2) = fX1(x′1)× fX2(x′2)
fX1,X2(x1,x2) = fX1(x1)× fX2(x2)
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with the joint density fX1,X2(x1,x2). Since X1,X2 are independent, this joint density is the
product of the marginals, fX1(x1)× fX2(x2). This means that we can evaluate the likelihood of
observing x2 < x1 as
Pr(x¯2 < x¯1) =
Z
∞
−∞
Z x1
−∞
fX2(x2) fX1(x1)dx2dx1 (5)
We integrate along the vertical line across values of x2 up until x1 in Panel B of the Figure 1
to get:
Pr(x¯2 < x¯1) = =
Z
∞
−∞
Z x1
−∞
fX2(x2)dx2 fX1(x1)dx1
=
Z
∞
−∞
FX2(x1) fX1(x1)dx1
(6)
We then integrate the value of the “vertical” integral across all values of x1:
Pr(x¯2 < x¯1) = EX1[FX2]. (7)
Equation 7 says that the likelihood that x¯2 < x¯1 is the expectation of the cumulative density
function of X2 with respect to the distribution of X1. Our strategy is to use the bootstrap
distributions to estimate the densities involved and use numerical integration over a pointwise
two-dimensional grid of values to evaluate the empirical probability of observing x¯2 < x¯1 for
interesting pairwise comparisons. These empirical probabilities are our p-values.
In implementing our test procedures, we make no allowance for the fact that we conduct
multiple tests on the same statistics. Moreover, we ignore the fact that tests on different pa-
rameters are correlated. Nonetheless, we believe our procedure conveys useful information of
the role of sampling error in our cross-country comparisons.
4 Intergenerational earnings persistence and mobility
In this section, we start by showing estimated intergenerational earnings elasticities and corre-
lations for the parent-child pairs in order to contrast our findings with the previous literature.
We then proceed to report our main contribution, the estimated quintile group mobility ma-
trices and mobility statistics based on these. The section includes additional results aimed at
examining if the sample restrictions and data choices that are in part dictated by the inclusion
of the U.K. data affects our results.
Regression and correlation coefficients
We show in Table 2 the estimated log earnings elasticities and correlation coefficients for
father-offspring pairs with positive earnings in at least one year. Focusing first on men, we
note that the elasticity and correlation coefficients offer a clear and mostly consistent ordering
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Table 2 Pairwise comparisons for selected parameters – regression and correlation coefficients
A. Men B. Women
Elasticity β
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.071
[0.064,0.079]
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
Fi 0.173
[0.135,0.211]
. >ol
(21.9)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
No 0.155
[0.137,0.174]
. . <
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
Sw 0.258
[0.234,0.281]
. . . <ol
(8.4)
<
(0.0)
UK 0.306
[0.242,0.370]
. . . . <
(0.0)
US 0.517
[0.444,0.590]
. . . . .
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.034
[0.027,0.041]
<
(1.1)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
Fi 0.080
[0.042,0.118]
. <ol
(7.4)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
No 0.114
[0.090,0.137]
. . <
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.1)
Sw 0.191
[0.166,0.216]
. . . <
(1.0)
<ol
(4.4)
UK 0.331
[0.223,0.440]
. . . . >ol
(27.1)
US 0.283
[0.181,0.385]
. . . . .
Correlation βσP/σO
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.089
[0.079,0.099]
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
Fi 0.157
[0.128,0.186]
. >ol
(12.7)
>ol
(15.9)
<ol
(5.9)
<
(0.0)
No 0.138
[0.123,0.152]
. . <ol
(38.7)
<
(0.4)
<
(0.0)
Sw 0.141
[0.129,0.152]
. . . <
(0.4)
<
(0.0)
UK 0.198
[0.156,0.240]
. . . . <
(0.0)
US 0.357
[0.306,0.409]
. . . . .
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.045
[0.036,0.054]
<ol
(3.9)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
Fi 0.074
[0.045,0.103]
. <ol
(28.0)
<ol
(3.6)
<ol
(0.6)
<
(0.4)
No 0.084
[0.070,0.099]
. . <ol
(3.6)
<
(0.9)
<
(0.5)
Sw 0.102
[0.090,0.113]
. . . <ol
(4.3)
<ol
(2.2)
UK 0.141
[0.099,0.183]
. . . . <ol
(30.3)
US 0.160
[0.105,0.215]
. . . . .
Note: See sections 2 and 3 for definitions of the data. These results include only non-zero observations of both
offspring and father. Regressions are in log form. The numbers in brackets below the point estimates show the
bias corrected 95 percent bootstrap confidence interval. The entries after the 1st column show the direction of
the difference between the estimate for the country in the row and the column, i.e., ˆθrow − ˆθcolumn, where <,>
denote a negative and a positive difference, respectively. The ol in <ol ,>ol denotes cases where the confidence
intervals for ˆθrow and ˆθcolumn overlap. The number in parentheses is the probability, in percentage terms, of the
opposite order of what has in fact been observed. If ˆθrow > ˆθcolumn, this is the probability, in light of the estimated
sampling distribution, that ˆθrow < ˆθcolumn.
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of intergenerational mobility. The Nordic countries have the highest and United States the
lowest level of mobility. The United Kingdom lies between the two. The differences between
the U.S., the U.K. and the Nordic countries are mostly statistically significant, as can clearly be
verified by the non-overlapping (95 per cent) confidence intervals. The four Nordic countries
are very similar, perhaps with slightly higher mobility in Denmark and Norway than in Fin-
land and Sweden – although the Norway-Finland comparison turns out not to be statistically
significant. At this point, our results confirm what previous studies have found.
There is one exception where the difference in earnings persistence between Nordic coun-
tries and the U.K. fails to be significant. The point estimates of the elasticities for Sweden
and the U.K. are θ̂SW = 0.258 and θ̂UK = 0.306 and their difference is ∆θ̂UK-SW = 0.048. In
light of the estimated sampling distributions for these two independent random variables, we
estimate the probability of the region in which, contrary to what the point estimates suggest,
θ̂SW > θ̂UK. This probability, our equation 5, turns out to be 8.4 percent. While low, it is
higher than the conventional rejection probability of 5 percent so we do not reject the null that
they are the same.
The Swedish elasticity of 0.258 suggests that intergenerational mobility is lower in Sweden
compared to the other Nordic countries. One reason for the high estimate, however, is that
the general inequality in the incomes distribution has increased more in Sweden than in the
other countries (as measured by the ratio of variances). Ceteris paribus, a general increase in
inequality (from the parent to the offspring generation) raises the incomes elasticity, but not
the correlation coefficient.
Moving to the correlation coefficients, the differences among the Nordic countries are
rarely statistically significant, except that Denmark always exhibits higher mobility. However,
all pairwise comparisons of a Nordic country with either the U.K or the U.S are significant,
as are the findings that the regression and correlation coefficients in the U.K. are lower than
those in the U.S.
For women, our estimates of the differences between countries are much smaller. The
ordering of countries is more or less the same as for men, but the estimates are less precise
and the confidence intervals are no longer consistently non-overlapping. Intergenerational
mobility is highest in the Nordic countries, lowest in the U.S, and somewhere between in the
U.K. Again, the Swedish elasticity estimate is somewhat higher than in the other Nordic coun-
tries, reflecting a general rise in income inequality from the father to the daughter generation.
From the pair-wise comparisons we find that both elasticities and correlations are significantly
lower for the Nordic countries than for the U.K. or and U.S. estimates. Comparing U.S. with
the U.K. there is no statistically significant difference in the intergenerational mobility for the
daughters.
Our linear model results are broadly in line with those found for sons in previous studies.
More than twenty estimates have been produced for U.S. men during the last fifteen years and
elasticities seem to cluster in the region 0.35 - 0.5, Solon (2002), Corak (2004a), although a
recent study suggests even higher persistence, Mazumder (2005). While few studies consider
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women, Chadwick & Solon (2002) report estimates in the range of 0.35-0.49, based on family
income, somewhat lower than the corresponding estimate for sons.
The first U.K. elasticity estimate of 0.36 based on weekly earnings, from sons of the city of
York, Atkinson (1981), Atkinson et al. (1983) is very similar to ours. The high estimate of 0.57
in Dearden et al. (1997) is commonly cited as an indicator of intergenerational mobility in the
U.K., but this is an IV-estimate using father’s schooling as an instrument. Acknowledging the
upward bias likely to be involved, recent U.K. studies like Blanden et al. (2004) use standard
least squares and report elasticities somewhat below ours for the 1958 cohort, 0.18 for sons
and 0.31 for daughters. As we both use the NCDS data, the divergence reflects in part the fact
that we use data for older offspring, including outcomes at age 41 and not only at 33.
For Sweden, Björklund & Jäntti (1997) report an (IV) estimate for father-son pairs of 0.28
and elasticities in more recent studies based on register data are similar, (e.g. 0.24 in Björklund
& Chadwick 2003). Earlier estimates of intergenerational income elasticity in Finland are in
the same range as in this paper. The individuals in the sample in Österbacka (2001) are born
during 1950-1960, and observed three times when they are between 25 and 45. The elasticity
estimates are 0.13 for pairs of father-son and 0.10 for father-daughter pairs. In Pekkala &
Lucas (2005), the elasticity estimates for offspring born 1958-1960 is 0.23 for sons and 0.17
for daughters. They observe earnings for the offspring in many years, between ages of 25 and
59. For the parent’s generation, they use mean parental taxable income. Recent Norwegian
studies include Bratberg et al. (2005) who report an intergenerational elasticity of 0.13 for both
sons and daughters born in 1960. For Denmark, Eriksson et al. (2005) report a significantly
higher estimate of 0.29 for both genders, when offspring wage earnings are measured at age
47. Unlike most other Nordic studies, these are based on a survey data. Bonke et al. (2005),
who restrict both offpsring and parental age much like we do, but use a 5-year average of
father’s earnings, report an elasticity of .240 for men and .204 for women.
Mobility matrices and summary indices
We now examine the income quintile group transition matrices and the indices that are based
on these. The full mobility tables, based also on samples that include zero earners (in both
generations) are shown in the appendix. To facilitate comparison of intergenerational mo-
bility across countries, we focus on mobility matrices, i.e., we look at how the children are
distributed conditional on father’s status.10 Table 3 reports summary measures of intergener-
ational mobility based on the quintile mobility matrices as well as all pairwise cross-country
comparisons for each these indices.
For men, all four summary measures identify the United States as the country with least
10The unconditional cross tabulations are available from the authors on request. The U.S. data, based as on
surveys with varying sampling probabilities, supply sampling weights that should be used to generate unbiased
estimates. We use those but rescale the weights to sum to sample rather than population size. Thus, for these data
sets the raw counts in the appendix can take non-integer values even if they sum (approximately) to the actual
number of underlying cases.
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Table 3 Pairwise comparisons for selected parameters – mobility matrix indices
A. Men B. Women
Mobility index: MT
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.923
[0.919,0.928]
<ol
(32.3)
>ol
(39.9)
<ol
(19.8)
<ol
(13.8)
>
(0.0)
Fi 0.928
[0.912,0.944]
. >ol
(28.2)
>ol
(48.3)
<ol
(26.1)
>
(0.0)
No 0.922
[0.916,0.929]
. . <ol
(16.6)
<ol
(12.3)
>
(0.0)
Sw 0.927
[0.921,0.933]
. . . <ol
(20.9)
>
(0.0)
UK 0.938
[0.913,0.962]
. . . . >
(0.0)
US 0.857
[0.822,0.892]
. . . . .
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.945
[0.941,0.950]
<ol
(17.6)
<ol
(6.8)
<ol
(4.1)
>ol
(32.7)
>ol
(24.9)
Fi 0.954
[0.937,0.970]
. >ol
(43.8)
>ol
(45.1)
>ol
(17.4)
>ol
(15.7)
No 0.952
[0.945,0.959]
. . <ol
(48.3)
>ol
(16.4)
>ol
(16.0)
Sw 0.952
[0.946,0.958]
. . . >ol
(15.5)
>ol
(15.5)
UK 0.940
[0.916,0.963]
. . . . >ol
(36.5)
US 0.932
[0.894,0.969]
. . . . .
Mobility index: ML
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.776
[0.767,0.785]
<ol
(8.3)
<ol
(41.3)
>ol
(43.1)
<ol
(49.2)
>
(0.0)
Fi 0.804
[0.759,0.848]
. >ol
(10.9)
>ol
(7.8)
>ol
(24.1)
>
(0.0)
No 0.778
[0.764,0.791]
. . >ol
(36.2)
<ol
(52.3)
>
(0.0)
Sw 0.774
[0.761,0.787]
. . . <ol
(46.9)
>
(0.0)
UK 0.787
[0.695,0.878]
. . . . >ol
(0.1)
US 0.653
[0.594,0.711]
. . . . .
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.834
[0.825,0.843]
<ol
(11.6)
<ol
(4.6)
<ol
(20.2)
<ol
(33.6)
>ol
(22.8)
Fi 0.858
[0.817,0.899]
. >ol
(36.0)
>ol
(22.2)
<ol
(59.6)
>ol
(15.2)
No 0.849
[0.835,0.863]
. . >ol
(23.0)
<ol
(52.9)
>ol
(17.0)
Sw 0.841
[0.828,0.855]
. . . <ol
(43.2)
>ol
(19.8)
UK 0.864
[0.764,0.963]
. . . . >ol
(18.4)
US 0.798
[0.675,0.921]
. . . . .
Mobility index: MF
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.832
[0.823,0.840]
<ol
(43.3)
>ol
(39.2)
>ol
(0.5)
>ol
(37.4)
>
(0.0)
Fi 0.834
[0.810,0.857]
. >ol
(37.2)
>ol
(7.5)
>ol
(35.0)
>
(0.0)
No 0.829
[0.818,0.841]
. . >ol
(2.9)
>ol
(42.5)
>
(0.0)
Sw 0.815
[0.805,0.824]
. . . <ol
(28.9)
>
(0.0)
UK 0.825
[0.790,0.860]
. . . . >
(0.1)
US 0.718
[0.669,0.768]
. . . . .
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.869
[0.860,0.877]
<ol
(7.8)
<
(0.1)
<ol
(3.0)
>ol
(49.9)
>
(1.0)
Fi 0.887
[0.864,0.910]
. <ol
(35.8)
>ol
(34.6)
>ol
(18.8)
>
(0.3)
No 0.892
[0.881,0.903]
. . >ol
(8.6)
>ol
(9.3)
>
(0.1)
Sw 0.881
[0.871,0.891]
. . . >ol
(23.7)
>
(0.3)
UK 0.868
[0.835,0.901]
. . . . >ol
(2.6)
US 0.808
[0.757,0.858]
. . . . .
Mobility index: MB
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 1.373
[1.363,1.382]
<ol
(39.1)
>ol
(8.5)
>ol
(26.7)
>ol
(49.1)
>
(0.0)
Fi 1.378
[1.344,1.411]
. >ol
(17.8)
>ol
(29.2)
>ol
(42.4)
>
(0.0)
No 1.360
[1.346,1.374]
. . <ol
(23.4)
<ol
(34.9)
>
(0.0)
Sw 1.367
[1.355,1.380]
. . . <ol
(45.4)
>
(0.0)
UK 1.372
[1.323,1.421]
. . . . >
(0.0)
US 1.198
[1.133,1.264]
. . . . .
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 1.434
[1.424,1.444]
<ol
(6.0)
<ol
(1.3)
<ol
(3.1)
<ol
(24.6)
>ol
(10.2)
Fi 1.463
[1.429,1.497]
. >ol
(32.0)
>ol
(23.8)
>ol
(35.6)
>ol
(3.2)
No 1.454
[1.440,1.469]
. . >ol
(33.8)
>ol
(47.1)
>ol
(3.7)
Sw 1.450
[1.437,1.462]
. . . <ol
(48.2)
>ol
(4.7)
UK 1.451
[1.404,1.499]
. . . . >ol
(7.2)
US 1.383
[1.308,1.459]
. . . . .
Note: For all the mobility indices greater values suggest greater mobility. See equations 1 to 4 for definitions and
interpretation. See Table 2 for an explanation of the structure of the entries.
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intergenerational income mobility. But apart from this finding, there appear to be only rel-
atively small differences between the various countries, and the ranking is to some extent
measure-dependent. In particular, it is no longer the case that the U.K. is unambiguously
placed between the U.S. and the Nordic countries. Regardless of which of the matrix-based
measures one looks at, the U.K. is not significantly different from the Nordic countries. For
women, the picture is even more blurred. The only crystal-clear result is that there is less
intergenerational mobility in the U.S. than in the other countries. For men, this difference is
in every case statistically significant. For women, it is more often the case that the difference
fails to be significant at conventional levels. Note also that the Nordic ranking differs from the
linear model. Denmark is not highest and Sweden not necessarily the highest.
We now turn to the estimated mobility matrices. The full mobility matrices, both excluding
zero father-offspring pairs and including them, are shown in Tables 12- 15 in the Appendix.
First, for men, the Nordic countries are relatively similar in all parts of the bivariate father-
offspring earnings distribution. In particular, approximately 25 per cent of sons born into the
poorest quintile remain in that position themselves, while around 10-15 per cent reach the
very top quintile (compared to the 20 per cent who would have ended up in each of these two
states if the distribution of offspring earnings was completely random). The bottom-to-top
mobility is significantly larger in Denmark than in the other Nordic countries. The persistence
of very high incomes is much larger than the persistence of very low incomes in all the Nordic
countries – around 35 per cent of sons born into the richest quintile remain in that position.
An interesting set of cross-country differences emerge from the study of the extreme cells,
or “corners” of the mobility matrix, shown for both sons and daughters in Table 4. Comparing
the Nordic matrices with those of the U.S., there is one difference that immediately stands
out as significant, substantively as well as statistically, and that is the much lower upwards
mobility out of the poorest quintile group in the U.S. More than 40 per cent of U.S. males born
into this position remain there. For this away-from-the-bottom mobility measure, the U.K. is
much more similar to the Nordic countries than to the U.S.. The probability that the son of
a lowest-quintile father makes it into the top quintile group – “rags-to-riches” mobility – is
lower in the U.S. than in all other countries, statistically significantly so for Denmark, Norway
and the U.K. These two findings – higher low-income persistence and a lower likelihood of
rags-to-riches mobility – seem to us quite powerful evidence against the traditional notion of
American exceptionalism consisting of a greater rate of upward social mobility than in other
countries. In light of this evidence, the U.S. appears to be exceptional in having less rather
than more upward mobility.
Another interesting difference between the U.S. and the Nordic countries is that of top-
to-bottom downwards mobility. Fewer than 10 per cent of U.S. males born into the richest
quintile take the step all the way down to the bottom quintile, while this is typically the case
for around 15 per cent of Nordic males. And at this point, the U.K. is more similar to the
U.S. than to the Nordic countries. As pointed out already by Atkinson (1981, p 213), there is
less long-distance mobility down from the top than there is upward mobility from the bottom.
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Table 4 Pairwise comparisons for selected parameters – conditional probability of being in
the extreme diagonal and antidiagonal cells
A. Men B. Women
Pr(Offspring in lowest quintile group| Father in lowest group)
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.247
[0.240,0.254]
<ol
(1.3)
<
(0.0)
<ol
(4.1)
<
(0.3)
<
(0.0)
Fi 0.278
[0.253,0.303]
. <ol
(39.8)
>ol
(8.0)
<ol
(14.9)
<
(0.0)
No 0.282
[0.272,0.292]
. . >
(0.0)
<ol
(16.0)
<
(0.0)
Sw 0.258
[0.248,0.267]
. . . <ol
(1.4)
<
(0.0)
UK 0.303
[0.264,0.342]
. . . . <
(0.0)
US 0.422
[0.362,0.481]
. . . . .
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.235
[0.228,0.243]
<ol
(44.0)
>ol
(47.7)
<ol
(28.3)
>ol
(45.1)
<ol
(25.2)
Fi 0.238
[0.212,0.264]
. >ol
(42.5)
<ol
(48.2)
>ol
(40.7)
<ol
(29.6)
No 0.235
[0.224,0.246]
. . <ol
(28.8)
>ol
(46.2)
<ol
(24.6)
Sw 0.239
[0.230,0.249]
. . . >ol
(37.2)
<ol
(29.5)
UK 0.232
[0.196,0.268]
. . . . <ol
(24.7)
US 0.256
[0.201,0.310]
. . . . .
Pr(Offspring in highest quintile group| Father in lowest group)
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.144
[0.138,0.150]
>
(0.3)
>
(0.0)
>
(0.0)
>ol
(8.0)
>
(0.0)
Fi 0.113
[0.094,0.133]
. <ol
(27.8)
>ol
(35.2)
<ol
(31.6)
>ol
(5.2)
No 0.119
[0.111,0.128]
. . >ol
(3.3)
<ol
(44.1)
>ol
(1.6)
Sw 0.109
[0.101,0.116]
. . . <ol
(20.4)
>ol
(5.4)
UK 0.122
[0.093,0.152]
. . . . >ol
(3.5)
US 0.079
[0.044,0.113]
. . . . .
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.160
[0.153,0.166]
>ol
(2.1)
>
(0.4)
>ol
(0.3)
<ol
(47.3)
>
(0.2)
Fi 0.136
[0.113,0.158]
. <ol
(27.5)
<ol
(22.3)
<ol
(9.9)
>ol
(4.6)
No 0.143
[0.134,0.153]
. . <ol
(39.8)
<ol
(14.2)
>
(1.6)
Sw 0.145
[0.137,0.153]
. . . <ol
(16.5)
>
(1.3)
UK 0.162
[0.130,0.194]
. . . . >ol
(0.8)
US 0.097
[0.062,0.132]
. . . . .
Pr(Offspring in lowest quintile group| Father in highest group)
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.153
[0.146,0.159]
>ol
(43.0)
>ol
(12.2)
<ol
(3.5)
>
(0.1)
>
(0.3)
Fi 0.151
[0.129,0.173]
. >ol
(37.1)
<ol
(17.1)
>ol
(0.8)
>ol
(1.0)
No 0.146
[0.137,0.155]
. . <ol
(0.4)
>
(0.5)
>
(0.8)
Sw 0.163
[0.154,0.171]
. . . >
(0.0)
>
(0.1)
UK 0.107
[0.079,0.134]
. . . . >ol
(32.2)
US 0.095
[0.055,0.135]
. . . . .
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.172
[0.165,0.179]
>ol
(49.9)
>ol
(46.8)
>ol
(10.0)
>ol
(1.2)
<ol
(39.7)
Fi 0.172
[0.148,0.196]
. >ol
(50.3)
>ol
(30.3)
>ol
(3.3)
<ol
(40.4)
No 0.171
[0.162,0.181]
. . >ol
(16.2)
>ol
(1.5)
<ol
(38.9)
Sw 0.165
[0.156,0.173]
. . . >ol
(3.7)
<ol
(30.4)
UK 0.134
[0.103,0.166]
. . . . <ol
(8.8)
US 0.180
[0.123,0.237]
. . . . .
Pr(Offspring in highest quintile group| Father in highest group)
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.363
[0.356,0.371]
>ol
(13.4)
>ol
(11.3)
<ol
(10.4)
>
(0.1)
>ol
(48.2)
Fi 0.347
[0.321,0.374]
. <ol
(32.5)
<ol
(5.2)
>ol
(1.9)
<ol
(36.6)
No 0.354
[0.343,0.366]
. . <ol
(1.7)
>
(0.3)
<ol
(44.0)
Sw 0.371
[0.361,0.381]
. . . >
(0.0)
>ol
(37.6)
UK 0.297
[0.259,0.335]
. . . . <ol
(5.1)
US 0.360
[0.297,0.422]
. . . . .
Estimate Fi No Sw UK US
De 0.320
[0.312,0.327]
>ol
(34.7)
>ol
(18.3)
<ol
(29.0)
>ol
(20.5)
<ol
(32.3)
Fi 0.313
[0.287,0.340]
. >ol
(49.6)
<ol
(25.6)
>ol
(33.5)
<ol
(27.2)
No 0.313
[0.302,0.324]
. . <ol
(9.9)
>ol
(32.0)
<ol
(25.6)
Sw 0.323
[0.313,0.334]
. . . >ol
(15.9)
<ol
(36.4)
UK 0.303
[0.265,0.341]
. . . . <ol
(19.8)
US 0.338
[0.270,0.407]
. . . . .
Note: See Table 2 for an explanation of the structure of the entries.
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The probability that the son of a rich father remains in that group is highest in the U.S. and
lowest in the U.K., but not statistically significantly so. The persistence of high earnings is
very similar in the U.S. and the Nordic countries.
In more central parts of the bivariate income distributions, as shown in Tables 12- 15
in the Appendix, all six countries are remarkably similar, a point we shall return to in our
concluding comments. Hence, we conclude that most of the difference reflected in elasticity
and correlation measures discussed above reflect the phenomenon that mobility out of the
lowest earnings quintile group is much lower in the U.S. than in the other countries, and that
mobility from the top to the bottom of the earnings distributions is lower in both the U.S. and
the U.K. than in the Nordic countries.
For daughters, the picture is again much more blurred, and most differences between coun-
tries are not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. A point to note, how-
ever, is that daughters born into poor families in the U.S. have a much higher probability of
climbing up the income distribution than their brothers have. The out-of-poverty mobility for
women is almost at the same level as for the other five countries, i.e. around 75 per cent.
However, very few of them (around 9 per cent according to the point estimate) reach the very
top quintile. This bottom-to-top mobility seems to be higher in all the other countries (around
15 per cent). Apart from this, there are only minor differences between the mobility matrices
for the different countries.
In conclusion, a fairly rich picture emerges from an examination of the transition proba-
bilities combined with the elasticities and correlations. Admittedly, the comparable data that
we could construct suffer from the well-known short-coming that having only a single year of
parental income data tends to bias the estimated elasticities downward. The bias may well vary
across countries and is likely to affect the mobility tables as well. However, a comparison of
our regression-based results suggest the same ordering as other within-country studies, where
this bias has been reduced. The mobility matrices enrich our picture of the orderings gener-
ated by the elasticities and correlations, in particular in allowing us to examine persistence and
movements in various parts of the distribution.
Sensitivity analyses
This section contains results from several sensitivity checks. We show that some potentially
crucial limitations imposed by the U.K. data do not have serious implications for our cross
country comparisons. First, a single year of earnings is, of course, a noisy measure of perma-
nent earnings. Since we have but a single year of parental earnings, we know our regression
coefficients are likely to be downward-inconsistent estimates of the population parameters.11
The impact of such attenuation bias on the cross-country comparisons can be assessed by
11This is not necessarily a reason for preferring mobility matrices, however, as measurement errors in earnings
lead to both biased estimates of the percentiles (depending on the exact type of measurement error) and to
classification error. It is possible that, as in the regression coefficient case, use of annual rather than long-run
incomes lead us to underestimate mobility.
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means of extended data for the United States and the Nordic countries. We find it unlikely that
the Nordic-U.S. differential is explained by measurement error, since it would require that
Nordic register data were less reliable than the self-reported U.S. measure of parental income.
Moreover, transitory earnings shocks are unlikely to be more important in countries with less
wage dispersion and lower unemployment.
Our expectation is lent support by the results in Tables 5–7, where we have replaced the
single year observation with the average of two years of parental income for the United States,
Finland, Sweden and Norway. For Sweden and Finland, we build on earnings observations five
years apart, in the census years 1970 and 1975. For Norway, we report an eight-year average of
annual earnings, but the Norwegian results are not very sensitive to the exact number of years.
For the NLSY, we include a two-year average of father’s family income. In all cases, our data
are unbalanced, i.e., we use all cases that contribute at least one valid income observation.
Focusing on males, we find higher regression coefficients in all countries, except Norway
where the estimate is about the same (Table 5).12 Most important, the ordering of countries
remains intact and the magnitude of the cross-country differences are hardly affected. As the
dispersion of parental earnings falls when we use a two year average, the correlation coefficient
is less affected than the elasticity and it actually drops for two of our four countries.
A two-year average of family income raises the value of the mobility matrix-based indices
in Table 6 for the U.S. males and they drop a little for the Nordic countries. Thus, the differ-
ences between the Nordic countries and the U.S. are now smaller than before, but the Nordic
countries still display significantly more mobility than the U.S.. Finally, examination of the
four “corners” of the mobility matrix (Table 7) still suggests that the U.S. has the greatest
persistence of poverty, has lower extreme movements and has slightly greater persistence of
riches. The main difference is that our comparisons across countries of the probability that
the son of a poor father ends up in the top quintile group (“rags-to-riches”) no longer provide
unambiguous evidence. The confidence intervals remain overlapping, but the upward long-
distance mobility is lower, albeit not statistically significantly so, in the U.S. than in Sweden,
Norway and Finland.
For women, the earnings persistence, measured by regression and correlation coefficients,
are higher in all countries but the comparative perspective on Nordic countries vis a vis the
United States remains. Just like in our base case, no firm conclusions can be drawn from the
mobility indices and matrices.
The second issue relates to weekly versus annual earnings for the offspring generation.
While the literature typically provides evidence using annual measures, only weekly earnings
are available for the U.K.. Since adult unemployment is no doubt related to family background
and the unemployment insurance replacement ratio is below unity, one might expect that the
effect on annual earnings exceeds the effect on weekly earnings. The former also captures the
12In Norway, there are two different issues. Lengthening the time-period during which father’s are observed
would lead to a smaller transitory variance, but this also allows for a less restrictive sample, allowing for greater
heterogeneity.
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Table 5 Sensivitity analysis using multi-year average of parental income: Pairwise compar-
isons for selected parameters – regression and correlation coefficients
A. Men B. Women
Elasticity β
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.213
[0.172,0.253]
>
(0.4)
<ol
(1.7)
<
(0.0)
No 0.150
[0.132,0.168]
. <
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
Sw 0.267
[0.241,0.293]
. . <
(0.0)
US 0.531
[0.456,0.606]
. . .
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.099
[0.061,0.137]
<ol
(16.8)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
No 0.121
[0.099,0.143]
. <
(0.0)
<
(0.1)
Sw 0.204
[0.179,0.229]
. . <ol
(4.0)
US 0.307
[0.200,0.415]
. . .
Correlation βσP/σO
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.179
[0.150,0.208]
>ol
(1.5)
>ol
(1.0)
<
(0.0)
No 0.142
[0.127,0.157]
. >ol
(45.1)
<
(0.0)
Sw 0.140
[0.128,0.153]
. . <
(0.0)
US 0.347
[0.303,0.391]
. . .
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.087
[0.059,0.114]
<ol
(34.7)
<ol
(11.3)
<ol
(1.7)
No 0.093
[0.079,0.107]
. <ol
(9.9)
<ol
(1.9)
Sw 0.105
[0.094,0.116]
. . <ol
(4.5)
US 0.153
[0.101,0.205]
. . .
Note: See Table 2 for an explanation of the structure of the entries.
Table 6 Sensivitity analysis using multi-year average of parental income: Pairwise compar-
isons for selected parameters – mobility matrix indices
A. Men B. Women
Mobility index: MT
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.926
[0.910,0.941]
>ol
(20.0)
>ol
(18.0)
>
(0.3)
No 0.918
[0.911,0.925]
. >ol
(47.0)
>
(0.5)
Sw 0.918
[0.912,0.924]
. . >
(0.5)
US 0.872
[0.838,0.905]
. . .
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.955
[0.939,0.971]
>ol
(31.9)
>ol
(22.3)
>ol
(18.3)
No 0.951
[0.944,0.958]
. >ol
(31.0)
>ol
(23.1)
Sw 0.949
[0.943,0.955]
. . >ol
(27.1)
US 0.937
[0.900,0.973]
. . .
Mobility index: MB
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 1.362
[1.329,1.394]
>ol
(15.8)
>ol
(32.4)
>
(0.0)
No 1.343
[1.329,1.357]
. <ol
(16.1)
>
(0.0)
Sw 1.353
[1.340,1.366]
. . >
(0.0)
US 1.201
[1.138,1.264]
. . .
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 1.454
[1.420,1.489]
>ol
(27.2)
>ol
(22.5)
>ol
(4.3)
No 1.442
[1.427,1.458]
. >ol
(41.3)
>ol
(6.0)
Sw 1.440
[1.427,1.453]
. . >ol
(6.7)
US 1.384
[1.313,1.455]
. . .
Note: See Table 2 for an explanation of the structure of the entries.
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Table 7 Sensivitity analysis using multi-year average of parental income: Pairwise compar-
isons for selected parameters – conditional probability of being in the extreme diagonal and
antidiagonal cells
A. Men B. Women
Pr(Offspring in lowest quintile group| Father in lowest group)
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.282
[0.256,0.307]
<ol
(30.1)
>ol
(25.3)
<
(0.1)
No 0.290
[0.279,0.300]
. >ol
(0.9)
<
(0.1)
Sw 0.272
[0.262,0.281]
. . <
(0.0)
US 0.379
[0.326,0.431]
. . .
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.243
[0.218,0.268]
>ol
(48.6)
<ol
(50.0)
>ol
(51.2)
No 0.242
[0.231,0.253]
. <ol
(44.0)
<ol
(49.8)
Sw 0.244
[0.234,0.253]
. . >ol
(50.8)
US 0.243
[0.191,0.295]
. . .
Pr(Offspring in highest quintile group| Father in lowest group)
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.119
[0.099,0.138]
>ol
(32.4)
>ol
(5.6)
>ol
(13.2)
No 0.113
[0.105,0.121]
. >ol
(2.0)
>ol
(16.9)
Sw 0.102
[0.094,0.109]
. . >ol
(38.3)
US 0.096
[0.062,0.129]
. . .
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.129
[0.107,0.150]
<ol
(23.6)
<ol
(29.5)
>ol
(12.4)
No 0.138
[0.128,0.147]
. >ol
(37.3)
>ol
(4.2)
Sw 0.135
[0.127,0.144]
. . >ol
(5.1)
US 0.102
[0.064,0.140]
. . .
Pr(Offspring in lowest quintile group| Father in highest group)
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.145
[0.123,0.167]
>ol
(43.0)
<ol
(5.6)
>ol
(3.0)
No 0.142
[0.134,0.151]
. <
(0.0)
>ol
(2.4)
Sw 0.165
[0.157,0.174]
. . >
(0.1)
US 0.102
[0.065,0.139]
. . .
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.176
[0.152,0.200]
>ol
(26.0)
>ol
(18.3)
<ol
(47.9)
No 0.167
[0.157,0.177]
. >ol
(32.8)
<ol
(34.7)
Sw 0.164
[0.156,0.172]
. . <ol
(30.3)
US 0.178
[0.128,0.228]
. . .
Pr(Offspring in highest quintile group| Father in highest group)
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.353
[0.326,0.380]
<ol
(42.0)
<ol
(8.6)
<ol
(31.4)
No 0.357
[0.346,0.368]
. <ol
(1.7)
<ol
(34.6)
Sw 0.373
[0.363,0.383]
. . >ol
(46.3)
US 0.370
[0.312,0.427]
. . .
Estimate No Sw US
Fi 0.319
[0.291,0.346]
>ol
(37.3)
<ol
(26.3)
<ol
(33.8)
No 0.313
[0.302,0.324]
. <ol
(2.4)
<ol
(26.6)
Sw 0.329
[0.319,0.339]
. . <ol
(44.9)
US 0.334
[0.273,0.395]
. . .
Note: See Table 2 for an explanation of the structure of the entries.
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Table 8 Sensitivity analysis on using weekly incomes: Pairwise comparisons for selected parameters
Regression and correlation
A. Men B. Women
Elasticity β
Estimate US
UK 0.306
[0.242,0.370]
<
(0.1)
US 0.462
[0.394,0.529]
.
Estimate US
UK 0.331
[0.223,0.440]
>ol
(9.2)
US 0.237
[0.154,0.319]
.
Correlation βσP/σO
Estimate US
UK 0.198
[0.156,0.240]
<
(0.0)
US 0.354
[0.300,0.409]
.
Estimate US
UK 0.141
[0.099,0.183]
<ol
(27.2)
US 0.163
[0.108,0.217]
.
Mobility indices
Regression and correlation
Mobility index: MT
Estimate US
UK 0.938
[0.913,0.962]
>ol
(3.6)
US 0.898
[0.863,0.932]
.
Estimate US
UK 0.940
[0.916,0.963]
<ol
(16.6)
US 0.961
[0.926,0.996]
.
Mobility index: MB
Estimate US
UK 1.372
[1.323,1.421]
>
(0.0)
US 1.213
[1.146,1.281]
.
Estimate US
UK 1.451
[1.404,1.499]
>ol
(4.7)
US 1.375
[1.302,1.447]
.
The conditional corner probabilities
A. Men B. Women
Pr(Offspring in lowest quintile group| Father in lowest group)
Estimate US
UK 0.303
[0.264,0.342]
<ol
(4.8)
US 0.362
[0.306,0.418]
.
Estimate US
UK 0.232
[0.196,0.268]
>ol
(44.8)
US 0.227
[0.177,0.277]
.
Pr(Offspring in highest quintile group| Father in lowest group)
Estimate US
UK 0.122
[0.093,0.152]
>ol
(6.4)
US 0.085
[0.050,0.120]
.
Estimate US
UK 0.162
[0.130,0.194]
>
(0.3)
US 0.094
[0.062,0.126]
.
Pr(Offspring in lowest quintile group| Father in highest group)
Estimate US
UK 0.107
[0.079,0.134]
>ol
(4.9)
US 0.067
[0.031,0.103]
.
Estimate US
UK 0.134
[0.103,0.166]
<ol
(48.8)
US 0.137
[0.088,0.186]
.
Pr(Offspring in highest quintile group| Father in highest group)
Estimate US
UK 0.297
[0.259,0.335]
<ol
(28.7)
US 0.318
[0.260,0.377]
.
Estimate US
UK 0.303
[0.265,0.341]
<ol
(45.2)
US 0.309
[0.240,0.379]
.
Note: See Table 2 for an explanation of the structure of the entries.
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impact from family background on weeks of paid work during the year. When, for the U.S.,
we divide annual earnings by the reported number of weeks worked during the last year, we do
find lower estimates of intergenerational earnings persistence, in Table 8. (Note that reliable
register information on hours worked per year among adult men in the 1970s is not available
in the Nordic countries.) For example, the elasticity for men drops from 0.517 to 0.466, but
the earnings persistence remains significantly higher in the U.S. than in the U.K..
Turning to the mobility measures, the two indices confirm the result of higher mobility in
the U.K., although with a p-value of 3.6 percent for the trace index, MT . For the corners of
the mobility matrix we find that persistence is lower and mobility is higher in the U.S. when
we use of weekly earnings for sons. This suggests that a intergenerational disadvantage in the
U.S. may show up in working time and in unemployment. This further implies that our base
case tends to exaggerate the difference in mobility between the U.K. and the U.S.. On the
other hand, this also suggests that the differences between the U.K. and the Nordic countries
are larger, since the use of weekly earnings tends to give lower persistence and more mobility
than measures based on annual outcomes. For women, there is no clear U.K.-U.S. pattern
when we use weekly earnings as different measures give opposite results.
Table 9 Sensitivity analysis on using family income: Pairwise comparisons for selected pa-
rameters – regression and correlation coefficients
A. Men B. Women
Elasticity β
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.220
[0.181,0.260]
>
(0.0)
>ol
(25.1)
<ol
(1.3)
<
(0.0)
No 0.133
[0.117,0.148]
. <
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
Sw 0.204
[0.179,0.229]
. . <
(0.2)
<
(0.0)
UK 0.306
[0.242,0.370]
. . . <
(0.0)
US 0.517
[0.444,0.590]
. . . .
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.112
[0.074,0.150]
<ol
(44.4)
<ol
(2.3)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.1)
No 0.116
[0.096,0.136]
. <ol
(0.3)
<
(0.0)
<
(0.1)
Sw 0.159
[0.136,0.183]
. . <
(0.2)
<ol
(1.0)
UK 0.331
[0.223,0.440]
. . . >ol
(27.1)
US 0.283
[0.181,0.385]
. . . .
Correlation βσP/σO
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.190
[0.160,0.219]
>
(0.0)
>
(0.0)
<ol
(37.8)
<
(0.0)
No 0.126
[0.113,0.140]
. >ol
(32.0)
<
(0.1)
<
(0.0)
Sw 0.122
[0.109,0.135]
. . <
(0.0)
<
(0.0)
UK 0.198
[0.156,0.240]
. . . <
(0.0)
US 0.357
[0.306,0.409]
. . . .
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.100
[0.072,0.128]
>ol
(32.8)
>ol
(31.6)
<ol
(6.2)
<ol
(3.2)
No 0.093
[0.079,0.106]
. >ol
(49.0)
<ol
(2.0)
<ol
(1.0)
Sw 0.092
[0.080,0.104]
. . <ol
(1.8)
<
(1.0)
UK 0.141
[0.099,0.183]
. . . <ol
(30.3)
US 0.160
[0.105,0.215]
. . . .
Note: See Table 2 for an explanation of the structure of the entries.
The third check is related to the unit for which earnings are measured in the parents’
generation. In the Nordic countries economic resources during childhood and adolescence is
measured by the father’s labour earnings while family income from all sources are available
for the U.S. and U.K.. Income information on ’other sources’ are not available in Nordic
registers of the 1970s, but we have replaced father’s earnings with the sum of both parents for
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Table 10 Sensitivity analysis on using family income: Pairwise comparisons for selected pa-
rameters – mobility matrix indices
A. Men B. Women
Mobility index: MT
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.913
[0.897,0.929]
<ol
(6.0)
<
(0.0)
<ol
(5.3)
>
(0.3)
No 0.927
[0.920,0.934]
. <
(0.0)
<ol
(21.0)
>
(0.0)
Sw 0.943
[0.937,0.949]
. . >ol
(33.3)
>
(0.0)
UK 0.938
[0.913,0.962]
. . . >
(0.0)
US 0.857
[0.822,0.892]
. . . .
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.954
[0.937,0.971]
>ol
(37.2)
<ol
(46.4)
>ol
(16.8)
>ol
(15.1)
No 0.951
[0.944,0.958]
. <ol
(18.0)
>ol
(19.1)
>ol
(17.6)
Sw 0.955
[0.949,0.961]
. . >ol
(10.5)
>ol
(12.4)
UK 0.940
[0.916,0.963]
. . . >ol
(36.5)
US 0.932
[0.894,0.969]
. . . .
Mobility index: MB
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 1.325
[1.294,1.356]
<
(0.3)
<
(0.0)
<ol
(5.8)
>
(0.1)
No 1.372
[1.358,1.386]
. <
(0.0)
<ol
(52.2)
>
(0.0)
Sw 1.414
[1.402,1.427]
. . >ol
(5.4)
>
(0.0)
UK 1.372
[1.323,1.421]
. . . >
(0.0)
US 1.198
[1.133,1.264]
. . . .
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 1.446
[1.412,1.481]
>ol
(27.3)
<ol
(19.9)
<ol
(44.1)
>ol
(7.2)
No 1.434
[1.419,1.449]
. <
(0.3)
<ol
(25.5)
>ol
(10.3)
Sw 1.463
[1.450,1.476]
. . >ol
(33.5)
>ol
(2.2)
UK 1.451
[1.404,1.499]
. . . >ol
(7.2)
US 1.383
[1.308,1.459]
. . . .
Note: See Table 2 for an explanation of the structure of the entries.
Finland, Norway and Sweden and make new comparisons with the base case estimates for the
U.K and U.S, in Tables 9 – 11. For men, the elasticities as well as correlations are lowered
for Norway and Sweden. In Finland, however, persistence becomes more similar to what we
find in the U.K. and is significantly lower than in the U.S. only. Turning again to mobility
measures for men, the indices still show that mobility in the Nordic countries is higher than in
the U.S., but not significantly different from the U.K. The “corners” of the mobility matrix for
males suggests the same ordering of countries as in our base case. For women, the results are
unchanged if we use the sum of parents’ earnings rather than father’s earnings.
We have conducted a further sensitivity check (numbers not reported here), namely that
of excluding from the U.S. data those father-offspring pairs who belong to minority groups,
i.e., blacks and hispanics. The probability that the white, non-hispanic son of a lowest quintile
group father remains poor is only marginally lower than for the full sample (.381 compared
to base case .422) and still substantially higher than for the U.K. or the Nordic countries.
The regression elasticity is a little higher. We conclude that it is not the inclusion of racial
minorities in the U.S. data that accounts for its greater intergenerational income persistence.
In all cross-country studies based on the construction of national evidence from differ-
ent data-generating processes, comparability is crucial. The sensitivity analyses show that
our central conclusions hold and are not sensitive to the particular data differences we have
identified.
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Table 11 Sensitivity analysis on using family income: Pairwise comparisons for selected pa-
rameters – conditional probability of being in the extreme diagonal and antidiagonal cells
A. Men B. Women
Pr(Offspring in lowest quintile group| Father in lowest group)
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.281
[0.255,0.306]
<ol
(50.0)
>ol
(2.2)
<ol
(18.0)
<
(0.0)
No 0.281
[0.270,0.292]
. >
(0.0)
<ol
(15.0)
<
(0.0)
Sw 0.253
[0.243,0.262]
. . <
(0.7)
<
(0.0)
UK 0.303
[0.264,0.342]
. . . <
(0.0)
US 0.422
[0.362,0.481]
. . . .
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.224
[0.200,0.249]
<ol
(25.5)
<ol
(20.7)
<ol
(37.4)
<ol
(16.1)
No 0.234
[0.223,0.245]
. <ol
(41.2)
>ol
(47.5)
<ol
(23.9)
Sw 0.236
[0.227,0.246]
. . >ol
(43.4)
<ol
(26.0)
UK 0.232
[0.196,0.268]
. . . <ol
(24.7)
US 0.256
[0.201,0.310]
. . . .
Pr(Offspring in highest quintile group| Father in lowest group)
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.105
[0.086,0.124]
<ol
(3.8)
<ol
(14.6)
<ol
(17.7)
>ol
(10.2)
No 0.124
[0.115,0.133]
. >ol
(8.9)
>ol
(47.0)
>
(0.9)
Sw 0.116
[0.109,0.123]
. . <ol
(35.9)
>ol
(2.2)
UK 0.122
[0.093,0.152]
. . . >ol
(3.5)
US 0.079
[0.044,0.113]
. . . .
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.140
[0.118,0.162]
>ol
(36.0)
<ol
(46.3)
<ol
(14.1)
>ol
(3.1)
No 0.135
[0.125,0.145]
. <ol
(17.6)
<ol
(5.8)
>ol
(3.5)
Sw 0.141
[0.133,0.149]
. . <ol
(11.1)
>
(1.9)
UK 0.162
[0.130,0.194]
. . . >ol
(0.8)
US 0.097
[0.062,0.132]
. . . .
Pr(Offspring in lowest quintile group| Father in highest group)
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.138
[0.117,0.158]
<ol
(22.3)
<
(0.5)
>ol
(4.1)
>ol
(3.5)
No 0.147
[0.138,0.156]
. <
(0.1)
>
(0.4)
>
(0.8)
Sw 0.169
[0.160,0.177]
. . >
(0.0)
>
(0.0)
UK 0.107
[0.079,0.134]
. . . >ol
(32.2)
US 0.095
[0.055,0.135]
. . . .
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.159
[0.135,0.182]
<ol
(46.2)
<ol
(33.4)
>ol
(11.8)
<ol
(25.4)
No 0.160
[0.151,0.170]
. <ol
(28.0)
>ol
(6.5)
<ol
(25.7)
Sw 0.164
[0.156,0.173]
. . >ol
(3.8)
<ol
(30.2)
UK 0.134
[0.103,0.166]
. . . <ol
(8.8)
US 0.180
[0.123,0.237]
. . . .
Pr(Offspring in highest quintile group| Father in highest group)
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.362
[0.336,0.388]
>ol
(5.7)
>ol
(3.5)
>
(0.4)
>ol
(49.8)
No 0.338
[0.327,0.349]
. >ol
(36.9)
>ol
(2.3)
<ol
(25.7)
Sw 0.335
[0.326,0.345]
. . >ol
(3.0)
<ol
(23.0)
UK 0.297
[0.259,0.335]
. . . <ol
(5.1)
US 0.360
[0.297,0.422]
. . . .
Estimate No Sw UK US
Fi 0.328
[0.302,0.355]
>ol
(36.9)
>ol
(7.9)
>ol
(14.8)
<ol
(42.1)
No 0.323
[0.311,0.335]
. >ol
(2.5)
>ol
(16.7)
<ol
(36.0)
Sw 0.307
[0.298,0.317]
. . >ol
(43.0)
<ol
(20.1)
UK 0.303
[0.265,0.341]
. . . <ol
(19.8)
US 0.338
[0.270,0.407]
. . . .
Note: See Table 2 for an explanation of the structure of the entries.
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5 Concluding comments
There is a substantial recent literature on the extent of intergenerational earnings mobility for
different countries. We identify two significant shortcomings with much of this literature,
however. First, for the most part this literature examines the extent of earnings persistence
across generations by the estimation of simple parent-child elasticities and correlations. We
know far less about the detailed nature of mobility and persistence at different points of the
bivariate distributions. Second, and perhaps more importantly, very few studies are explic-
itly comparative in construction, relying instead on a comparison of estimates drawn from
independent country-specific studies. The current paper has attempted to extend the existing
literature by addressing both of these issues. Analysing both traditional elasticities and the
rather more general mobility patterns that are possible in a quintile group mobility matrix, we
examine how mobility patterns vary across countries when we impose on the data and analysis
as much similarity across countries as possible.
Our results suggest that all countries exhibit substantial earnings persistence across gener-
ations, but with statistically significant differences across countries among men, not women.
Mobility among men is lower in the U.S. than in the U.K., where it is lower again compared
to the Nordic countries. Surprisingly, we find that most of the cross-country difference in in-
come correlations and elasticities is confined to rather limited parts of the bivariate earnings
distribution: persistence is most pronounced in the tails of the distributions. For example, the
difference between the U.K. and the Nordic countries is to a large extent associated with the
lower downwards male mobility from the very top to the bottom end of the earnings distribu-
tion in the U.K.. An even lower long-distance mobility from the top is found for the United
States.
The main driver of the difference in the pattern of male intergenerational mobility in the
U.S. from that of each of the other countries in our study is the low mobility out of the lowest
quintile group in the United States. Indeed, it is very noticeable that while for all of the other
countries persistence is particularly high in the upper tails of the distribution, in the U.S. this
is reversed - with a particularly high likelihood that sons of the poorest fathers in the U.S. will
remain in the lowest earnings quintile. We view this as a challenge to the popular notion of an
“American exceptionalism” in economic mobility. Indeed, the combination of a high proba-
bility of American sons of the poorest fifth of fathers remaining in the lowest quintile group,
the lower probability of “rags-to-riches” (poorest to richest) and slightly lower probability of
“riches-to-rags” (richest to poorest), places the notion of American exceptionalism in a new
light. The U.S., or at least the population of young U.S. men, seems to be distinguished from
other countries by having greater low-income persistence, rather than less, having fewer very
large positional changes across generations, rather than more, and possibly having a greater
persistence of high income, rather than less.
While we are driven to make some non-ideal choices for our sample – using a single-year
average of parental income, weekly income and family income in place of father’s income –
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our sensitivity checks suggest that these are not responsible for our country orderings and that
the main results established in the paper remain intact.
It is intriguing to speculate about why the U.S. public appears to believe the U.S. has more,
not less, social and economic mobility than other advanced nations. One reason that may
account for the widespread belief is that it is the middle classes who primarily hold this belief.
An insightful article on this matter in the Financial Times a few years ago (Griffith 2001)
suggests that the poor in the U.S. are fully aware of their low chances of upward mobility but
the middle classes believe social mobility is prevalent. Our data may offer an insight into how
such a belief may be sustained. Namely, the “middle” of our moblity matrix, consisting of
the inner 3×3 matrix, is remarkably similar across countries, suggesting that the U.S. middle
classes are quite as likely to be mobile as those in the U.K. or the Nordic countries. In the U.S.,
such middle class moves are associated with fairly substantial changes in real living standards
(i.e., measured in actual dollars earned). We speculate that the fact that such changes in living
standards are experienced or witnessed by a substantial fraction of the U.S. population may
account for the widely held belief of substantial mobility. Because this substantial fraction
of the U.S. population includes the median voter, such attitudes might help explain why there
is not more political pressure for mobility-promoting policies in the country (cf. Alesina &
Glaeser 2004, ch. 3).
Finally, we note that international comparisons of intergenerational mobility are often mo-
tivated by the light they may shed on the mechanisms behind transmission of socio-economic
outcomes across generations. Such knowledge would in turn inform public policy interven-
tions designed to decrease intergenerational inequities. The understanding of the mechanisms
behind mobility should also be informed about where in the distribution we have great per-
sistence. Our results suggest that increases in overall mobility would most likely occur from
interventions designed to increase the mobility of the very poorest.
A Country data descriptions
Denmark The Danish data emanate from a longitudinal database, IDA, which contains de-
tailed register information about individuals’ labour market status and earnings for each year
during the period 1980-2000 for all people resident in Denmark in those years, and which has
been merged with the so called fertility database which provides detailed demographic infor-
mation about the individuals, their biological parents and siblings. The sons and daughters
are born in 1958-60, and their earnings are measured in 1998 and 2000. The fathers of the
offspring are 35-64 years of age when their earnings are measured in 1980. The earnings mea-
sure includes wages, salaries and self-employment income and the source of this information
is tax registers.
Finland The present Finnish data available come from the quinquennial census panel cov-
ering the period 1970 to 2000. Attached to this data set, is labor market statistics from the
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years 1987-2001. Information from registers have been used whenever possible, and com-
pletely since 1990. The data set covers a representative sample of Finnish residents in 1970,
and follows them and their household members over the years, always gathering new house-
hold members who either move in with or are born to original panel members (see Eriksson
& Jäntti 1997).
We use the Census definition of a family in 1975 to define the father-offspring relation. We
choose those father-offspring pairs where the children were born between 1958 and 1960 and
where the father was between 36 and 64 years old. The mean age of the fathers in 1975 is 47.
The earnings measure equals wages and salaries plus self-employment income and stem from
tax records. The earnings of the father are measured in 1975, when the children were between
15 and 17 years old. The earnings of the offspring are measured in 1993 and in 2000. In the
first wave, the offspring are 33-35 years old and in the second wave, they are 40-42 years old
(see (see Statistics Finland 2001).
Norway The Norwegian sample consists of the complete 1958 birth cohort, excluding for-
eign born later residents, offspring of immigrants and those who died before year 2000. Fa-
therhood is biological and given by the official birth register. A small proportion of cohort
members with a father without recorded earnings in any of the years 1967-2001 or educational
attainment in the official education register, are also excluded. Finally, the sample is restricted
to cohort members with a father aged 35-64 when fathers earnings is measured in 1974. Earn-
ings are from administrative records collected from tax returns and other government agencies.
Earnings are annual, before tax/deductions and include wages, self-employment income, un-
employment benefits and sick-leave payments. Capital income, social assistance, pensions
and other transfers are not included. Fathers earnings are measured at age 16, i.e. annual
earnings in 1974, while earnings of the cohort members are measured in 1992 and 1999. The
same data sources have been used previously in studies of families by Björklund et al. (2002),
Bratberg et al. (2005), Raaum et al. (2003) and Raaum et al. (2005).
Sweden The Swedish data stem from Statistics Sweden’s administrative registers. We use
a 20 percent random sample of the cohort born in 1962. The sample is drawn from those
born in Sweden and those who were born abroad but moved to Sweden before the age of
17 years. The parent-offspring relationship is that defined by Statistics Sweden in the 1975
Census household. Thus, we use a social definition of fatherhood. We measure this father’s
earnings in 1970, 1975 and 1980 and offspring’s earnings in 1996 and 1999. We include only
a single cohort of children, those born in 1962. They were 13 at the time we measure their
father’s earnings and 34 and 37 years old in 1996 and 2000. Statistics Sweden’s earnings
originally stem from tax assessment report by individuals and from employers’ compulsory
reports to tax authorities. Note though that earnings include self-employment income as well
as short-term sickness benefits.
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United Kingdom The National Child Development Survey (NCDS) began as a survey of all
children born in the U.K. in a particular week - March 3rd to March 9th - in 1958. Subsequent
follow-up surveys have been conducted in 1965, 1969, 1974, 1981, 1991 and 1999/2000. The
NCDS is recognised as a very rich data set that forms the basis for much of the leading work
on the empirical analysis of intergenerational mobility in the U.K. (see, for example, Dearden
et al. (1997), Gregg & Machin (1999), Gregg & Machin (2000) and Blanden et al. (2004).
The third sweep of the NCDS, NCDS3 in 1974, provides information on weekly net pay
of each parent and on all other sources of weekly net income when the child (that is, the cohort
member) was aged 16 years. This forms the basis of our measure of parental earnings. We
note that the underlying earnings variables are grouped into 12 earnings bands. The value
implemented is slightly off the interval midpoint, based on actual distributions from the GHS
(General Household Survey). The earnings of offspring are based on information on current
gross weekly earnings both from NCDS5 in 1991, when offspring were aged 33 years, and
from NCDS6 in 1999/2000, when offspring were aged 41 years. Dearden et al. (1997) have
compared the data on parental earnings in NCDS3 with data from the Family Expenditure
Survey of 1974. They find the estimated age-earnings profiles to be very similar and conclude
that the NCDS3 data on parental earnings are reliable. We note that the average age of fathers
in 1974 was 46. Thus, although information on father’s income is obtained when they are a
little older than offspring at the last date for which we have information on offspring earnings,
the difference in age is not great. In our empirical analysis we include controls for father’s
age. Information on father’s age comes from the original 1958 survey and so we restrict the
analysis to natural fathers in 1974.
United States (NLSY) The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth is a nationally represen-
tative sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-22 years old when they were
first surveyed in 1979. These individuals are now in their early forties, and have been inter-
viewed annually through 1994 and biennially since 1996. Since their first interview, many of
the respondents have made transitions from school to work, and from their parents’ homes to
being parents and homeowners. These data form the basis for a number of influential studies
of the labour market outcomes of American men and women born in the 1950s and 1960s.
For youths living at home with their father at the time of the initial survey, we use information
about family income as our measure of parental earnings. The family income variable pertains
to income earned during 1978, and includes any income from a number of potential sources
such as wages, self-employment earnings, disability benefits, and social security. The sample
is restricted to those born in the United States and whose father was aged 35 to 64 in 1978.
Taking advantage of the sibling structure of the data, we are able to increase the sample size
by observing parental income of younger siblings still living with their parents in 1979. In
sensitivity analysis, we also use family income in 1979. This information is collected from
youths living with their father in 1980, and the sample is extended, whenever possible, to in-
clude older siblings who have moved away from the family home. We base the analysis of
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offspring’s labour market status on data collected in 1996 and 2002. Earnings are measured
as the respondent’s total wage and salary income during the calendar year prior to the survey,
that is, earnings are from 1995 and 2001. Included in the sample are only those with a valid
earnings record for at least one of those years.
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B Appendix tables
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Table 12 Intergenerational mobility tables – earnings quintile group transition matrices corrected for age for fathers and sons. Excluding zeros
Denmark (n = 59213)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.247
[0.240,0.255]
0.226
[0.219,0.233]
0.194
[0.186,0.201]
0.189
[0.183,0.196]
0.144
[0.138,0.150]
fq2 0.208
[0.200,0.215]
0.249
[0.242,0.256]
0.220
[0.213,0.227]
0.188
[0.181,0.194]
0.135
[0.129,0.141]
fq3 0.188
[0.181,0.194]
0.211
[0.204,0.218]
0.224
[0.216,0.230]
0.207
[0.201,0.214]
0.171
[0.164,0.177]
fq4 0.165
[0.158,0.171]
0.178
[0.171,0.185]
0.204
[0.197,0.210]
0.223
[0.217,0.231]
0.230
[0.223,0.237]
fq5 0.153
[0.147,0.160]
0.118
[0.112,0.124]
0.156
[0.150,0.163]
0.209
[0.202,0.216]
0.363
[0.355,0.371]
Finland (n = 5458)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.278
[0.252,0.302]
0.234
[0.209,0.259]
0.203
[0.180,0.226]
0.172
[0.150,0.194]
0.113
[0.094,0.134]
fq2 0.192
[0.166,0.216]
0.216
[0.194,0.240]
0.249
[0.225,0.273]
0.191
[0.168,0.214]
0.153
[0.133,0.173]
fq3 0.177
[0.155,0.201]
0.198
[0.174,0.224]
0.219
[0.196,0.243]
0.216
[0.194,0.240]
0.189
[0.165,0.213]
fq4 0.164
[0.141,0.186]
0.195
[0.169,0.222]
0.195
[0.171,0.219]
0.229
[0.204,0.255]
0.218
[0.194,0.243]
fq5 0.151
[0.129,0.173]
0.156
[0.137,0.179]
0.140
[0.117,0.162]
0.206
[0.181,0.229]
0.347
[0.321,0.375]
Norway (n = 26656)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.282
[0.272,0.292]
0.234
[0.224,0.244]
0.205
[0.195,0.215]
0.159
[0.151,0.169]
0.119
[0.111,0.127]
fq2 0.202
[0.191,0.212]
0.238
[0.228,0.248]
0.223
[0.212,0.233]
0.200
[0.190,0.209]
0.137
[0.129,0.147]
fq3 0.188
[0.178,0.198]
0.209
[0.199,0.219]
0.215
[0.204,0.226]
0.210
[0.200,0.220]
0.177
[0.168,0.187]
fq4 0.173
[0.163,0.183]
0.183
[0.173,0.193]
0.204
[0.194,0.214]
0.221
[0.211,0.231]
0.218
[0.209,0.229]
fq5 0.146
[0.137,0.155]
0.135
[0.126,0.144]
0.155
[0.145,0.164]
0.209
[0.200,0.219]
0.354
[0.343,0.366]
Sweden (n = 31996)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.258
[0.248,0.267]
0.243
[0.233,0.253]
0.215
[0.205,0.224]
0.176
[0.167,0.184]
0.109
[0.102,0.116]
fq2 0.209
[0.201,0.218]
0.225
[0.216,0.235]
0.237
[0.228,0.246]
0.195
[0.185,0.204]
0.133
[0.125,0.141]
fq3 0.183
[0.174,0.192]
0.211
[0.201,0.220]
0.219
[0.210,0.229]
0.223
[0.214,0.232]
0.164
[0.155,0.173]
fq4 0.175
[0.166,0.184]
0.177
[0.168,0.186]
0.196
[0.187,0.205]
0.218
[0.208,0.227]
0.234
[0.224,0.244]
fq5 0.163
[0.155,0.171]
0.140
[0.131,0.148]
0.134
[0.126,0.142]
0.193
[0.184,0.202]
0.371
[0.361,0.381]
UK (n = 2205)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.303
[0.264,0.342]
0.235
[0.199,0.272]
0.165
[0.133,0.199]
0.174
[0.139,0.212]
0.122
[0.093,0.151]
fq2 0.241
[0.205,0.277]
0.227
[0.188,0.266]
0.182
[0.145,0.218]
0.193
[0.159,0.228]
0.157
[0.124,0.191]
fq3 0.188
[0.155,0.224]
0.195
[0.156,0.235]
0.227
[0.188,0.263]
0.206
[0.170,0.244]
0.184
[0.147,0.221]
fq4 0.161
[0.128,0.196]
0.175
[0.139,0.209]
0.229
[0.194,0.264]
0.195
[0.155,0.233]
0.240
[0.203,0.278]
fq5 0.107
[0.081,0.133]
0.168
[0.135,0.199]
0.197
[0.162,0.232]
0.231
[0.195,0.271]
0.297
[0.258,0.335]
USNLSY (n = 1798)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.422
[0.363,0.482]
0.245
[0.189,0.302]
0.153
[0.107,0.202]
0.102
[0.065,0.142]
0.079
[0.047,0.116]
fq2 0.194
[0.142,0.250]
0.283
[0.230,0.341]
0.208
[0.159,0.260]
0.174
[0.128,0.221]
0.140
[0.097,0.185]
fq3 0.194
[0.145,0.247]
0.186
[0.131,0.241]
0.256
[0.198,0.318]
0.202
[0.148,0.259]
0.162
[0.111,0.216]
fq4 0.125
[0.082,0.176]
0.182
[0.129,0.247]
0.198
[0.133,0.263]
0.252
[0.198,0.311]
0.243
[0.187,0.300]
fq5 0.095
[0.057,0.137]
0.122
[0.076,0.170]
0.189
[0.135,0.243]
0.234
[0.176,0.294]
0.360
[0.296,0.421]
Note: These results include only those father-offspring pairs that have non-zero earnings. The numbers in brackets below the point estimates show the bias corrected 95 percent
bootstrap confidence interval.
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Table 13 Intergenerational mobility tables – earnings quintile group transition matrices corrected for age for fathers and daughters. Excluding zeros
Denmark (n = 55178)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.235
[0.228,0.243]
0.213
[0.206,0.220]
0.206
[0.199,0.213]
0.185
[0.179,0.192]
0.160
[0.153,0.166]
fq2 0.215
[0.208,0.223]
0.232
[0.224,0.239]
0.225
[0.217,0.233]
0.189
[0.182,0.197]
0.139
[0.132,0.145]
fq3 0.188
[0.180,0.195]
0.204
[0.197,0.212]
0.216
[0.209,0.224]
0.208
[0.201,0.216]
0.184
[0.177,0.190]
fq4 0.178
[0.172,0.185]
0.184
[0.176,0.190]
0.196
[0.188,0.203]
0.216
[0.208,0.223]
0.227
[0.220,0.234]
fq5 0.172
[0.165,0.179]
0.148
[0.141,0.154]
0.150
[0.144,0.157]
0.211
[0.203,0.217]
0.320
[0.312,0.327]
Finland (n = 5144)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.238
[0.213,0.263]
0.201
[0.175,0.226]
0.230
[0.205,0.256]
0.195
[0.171,0.221]
0.136
[0.114,0.157]
fq2 0.222
[0.197,0.249]
0.225
[0.201,0.254]
0.202
[0.178,0.229]
0.191
[0.166,0.216]
0.159
[0.138,0.184]
fq3 0.187
[0.164,0.210]
0.190
[0.164,0.218]
0.203
[0.178,0.229]
0.225
[0.200,0.251]
0.195
[0.170,0.220]
fq4 0.181
[0.157,0.204]
0.206
[0.182,0.232]
0.196
[0.170,0.224]
0.206
[0.179,0.231]
0.210
[0.185,0.236]
fq5 0.172
[0.148,0.196]
0.166
[0.142,0.190]
0.160
[0.137,0.184]
0.188
[0.164,0.213]
0.313
[0.286,0.339]
Norway (n = 25046)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.235
[0.224,0.246]
0.214
[0.203,0.225]
0.209
[0.198,0.220]
0.199
[0.189,0.209]
0.143
[0.134,0.153]
fq2 0.212
[0.200,0.222]
0.225
[0.213,0.237]
0.223
[0.211,0.233]
0.196
[0.186,0.207]
0.145
[0.135,0.155]
fq3 0.191
[0.181,0.202]
0.206
[0.195,0.216]
0.211
[0.201,0.223]
0.203
[0.191,0.213]
0.189
[0.178,0.199]
fq4 0.188
[0.178,0.198]
0.192
[0.181,0.202]
0.199
[0.189,0.210]
0.208
[0.197,0.219]
0.212
[0.202,0.223]
fq5 0.171
[0.161,0.181]
0.159
[0.149,0.169]
0.161
[0.151,0.171]
0.195
[0.185,0.206]
0.313
[0.302,0.324]
Sweden (n = 30410)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.239
[0.229,0.248]
0.214
[0.205,0.224]
0.215
[0.205,0.224]
0.187
[0.178,0.196]
0.145
[0.137,0.153]
fq2 0.208
[0.199,0.217]
0.213
[0.204,0.223]
0.224
[0.215,0.233]
0.209
[0.200,0.219]
0.146
[0.137,0.155]
fq3 0.197
[0.188,0.207]
0.202
[0.192,0.211]
0.212
[0.202,0.221]
0.213
[0.203,0.223]
0.177
[0.167,0.186]
fq4 0.181
[0.172,0.190]
0.194
[0.184,0.203]
0.200
[0.190,0.210]
0.204
[0.195,0.214]
0.221
[0.211,0.231]
fq5 0.165
[0.156,0.173]
0.172
[0.163,0.180]
0.150
[0.142,0.158]
0.190
[0.181,0.199]
0.323
[0.313,0.333]
UK (n = 2348)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.232
[0.193,0.266]
0.226
[0.190,0.262]
0.198
[0.163,0.235]
0.183
[0.149,0.219]
0.162
[0.129,0.195]
fq2 0.211
[0.179,0.246]
0.249
[0.212,0.284]
0.185
[0.151,0.220]
0.181
[0.150,0.213]
0.174
[0.140,0.211]
fq3 0.224
[0.190,0.260]
0.164
[0.126,0.203]
0.232
[0.198,0.265]
0.192
[0.156,0.228]
0.188
[0.154,0.222]
fq4 0.200
[0.170,0.233]
0.209
[0.174,0.243]
0.194
[0.157,0.227]
0.226
[0.193,0.261]
0.172
[0.139,0.204]
fq5 0.134
[0.105,0.165]
0.154
[0.118,0.190]
0.190
[0.156,0.223]
0.220
[0.183,0.255]
0.303
[0.265,0.341]
USNLSY (n = 1607)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.256
[0.204,0.312]
0.232
[0.169,0.296]
0.252
[0.195,0.313]
0.163
[0.114,0.218]
0.097
[0.066,0.137]
fq2 0.197
[0.139,0.261]
0.241
[0.182,0.303]
0.195
[0.139,0.256]
0.206
[0.151,0.261]
0.161
[0.109,0.214]
fq3 0.202
[0.143,0.268]
0.257
[0.193,0.319]
0.206
[0.141,0.273]
0.166
[0.106,0.223]
0.169
[0.115,0.227]
fq4 0.171
[0.114,0.237]
0.178
[0.120,0.238]
0.185
[0.132,0.245]
0.233
[0.170,0.296]
0.233
[0.172,0.297]
fq5 0.180
[0.123,0.238]
0.114
[0.071,0.168]
0.143
[0.081,0.210]
0.225
[0.163,0.295]
0.338
[0.273,0.413]
Note: These results include only those father-offspring pairs that have non-zero earnings. The numbers in brackets below the point estimates show the bias corrected 95 percent
bootstrap confidence interval.
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Table 14 Intergenerational mobility tables – earnings quintile group transition matrices corrected for age for fathers and sons. Including zeros
Denmark (n = 87193)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.253
[0.246,0.260]
0.205
[0.198,0.212]
0.195
[0.188,0.202]
0.181
[0.174,0.187]
0.167
[0.161,0.173]
fq2 0.237
[0.230,0.244]
0.236
[0.229,0.243]
0.196
[0.189,0.203]
0.185
[0.179,0.192]
0.145
[0.139,0.151]
fq3 0.179
[0.172,0.186]
0.238
[0.232,0.246]
0.235
[0.228,0.242]
0.203
[0.196,0.210]
0.145
[0.138,0.151]
fq4 0.165
[0.159,0.172]
0.195
[0.188,0.201]
0.217
[0.211,0.224]
0.220
[0.214,0.227]
0.203
[0.195,0.210]
fq5 0.161
[0.154,0.167]
0.133
[0.128,0.139]
0.157
[0.151,0.163]
0.212
[0.205,0.219]
0.337
[0.329,0.344]
Finland (n = 6108)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.281
[0.255,0.304]
0.226
[0.205,0.248]
0.210
[0.187,0.233]
0.154
[0.133,0.175]
0.128
[0.111,0.149]
fq2 0.214
[0.191,0.237]
0.216
[0.194,0.238]
0.233
[0.209,0.255]
0.194
[0.170,0.219]
0.144
[0.124,0.164]
fq3 0.184
[0.161,0.206]
0.207
[0.183,0.229]
0.215
[0.191,0.241]
0.224
[0.199,0.249]
0.171
[0.148,0.194]
fq4 0.166
[0.144,0.187]
0.197
[0.173,0.221]
0.193
[0.168,0.217]
0.220
[0.197,0.245]
0.225
[0.201,0.249]
fq5 0.153
[0.130,0.175]
0.154
[0.134,0.172]
0.147
[0.126,0.167]
0.210
[0.187,0.232]
0.336
[0.310,0.362]
Norway (n = 28014)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.284
[0.275,0.294]
0.234
[0.225,0.245]
0.200
[0.190,0.210]
0.161
[0.152,0.171]
0.119
[0.111,0.127]
fq2 0.206
[0.196,0.216]
0.240
[0.230,0.250]
0.220
[0.209,0.230]
0.199
[0.190,0.209]
0.135
[0.126,0.144]
fq3 0.184
[0.174,0.193]
0.210
[0.200,0.221]
0.218
[0.208,0.229]
0.213
[0.203,0.223]
0.174
[0.165,0.185]
fq4 0.176
[0.166,0.186]
0.181
[0.172,0.190]
0.203
[0.192,0.213]
0.220
[0.210,0.230]
0.221
[0.211,0.231]
fq5 0.150
[0.141,0.159]
0.134
[0.125,0.142]
0.158
[0.149,0.168]
0.207
[0.197,0.217]
0.350
[0.339,0.362]
Sweden (n = 33959)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.267
[0.258,0.276]
0.238
[0.229,0.248]
0.210
[0.201,0.218]
0.173
[0.165,0.182]
0.111
[0.104,0.119]
fq2 0.208
[0.199,0.216]
0.230
[0.221,0.240]
0.233
[0.223,0.242]
0.195
[0.186,0.204]
0.134
[0.126,0.142]
fq3 0.184
[0.174,0.193]
0.209
[0.200,0.218]
0.224
[0.214,0.233]
0.222
[0.213,0.231]
0.162
[0.154,0.171]
fq4 0.176
[0.167,0.185]
0.178
[0.169,0.187]
0.198
[0.189,0.206]
0.219
[0.209,0.228]
0.230
[0.220,0.239]
fq5 0.163
[0.156,0.172]
0.142
[0.134,0.150]
0.136
[0.128,0.144]
0.192
[0.183,0.200]
0.367
[0.357,0.377]
UK (n = 2205)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.303
[0.264,0.342]
0.235
[0.199,0.272]
0.165
[0.133,0.199]
0.174
[0.139,0.212]
0.122
[0.093,0.151]
fq2 0.241
[0.205,0.277]
0.227
[0.188,0.266]
0.182
[0.145,0.218]
0.193
[0.159,0.228]
0.157
[0.124,0.191]
fq3 0.188
[0.155,0.224]
0.195
[0.156,0.235]
0.227
[0.188,0.263]
0.206
[0.170,0.244]
0.184
[0.147,0.221]
fq4 0.161
[0.128,0.196]
0.175
[0.139,0.209]
0.229
[0.194,0.264]
0.195
[0.155,0.233]
0.240
[0.203,0.278]
fq5 0.107
[0.081,0.133]
0.168
[0.135,0.199]
0.197
[0.162,0.232]
0.231
[0.195,0.271]
0.297
[0.258,0.335]
USNLSY (n = 1930)
Son
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.400
[0.348,0.451]
0.254
[0.206,0.307]
0.165
[0.121,0.209]
0.108
[0.074,0.148]
0.074
[0.042,0.109]
fq2 0.205
[0.155,0.260]
0.262
[0.206,0.320]
0.208
[0.156,0.265]
0.186
[0.139,0.233]
0.139
[0.094,0.183]
fq3 0.181
[0.132,0.234]
0.204
[0.147,0.262]
0.250
[0.192,0.312]
0.202
[0.149,0.266]
0.162
[0.111,0.214]
fq4 0.138
[0.094,0.185]
0.164
[0.117,0.217]
0.206
[0.153,0.264]
0.238
[0.184,0.294]
0.255
[0.198,0.313]
fq5 0.098
[0.060,0.141]
0.117
[0.074,0.166]
0.166
[0.113,0.220]
0.259
[0.199,0.316]
0.360
[0.298,0.421]
Note: These results include all father-offspring pairs, i.e., even those with zero earnings. The numbers in brackets below the point estimates show the bias corrected 95 percent
bootstrap confidence interval.
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Table 15 Intergenerational mobility tables – earnings quintile group transition matrices corrected for age for fathers and daughters. Including zeros
Denmark (n = 80637)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.213
[0.206,0.221]
0.208
[0.201,0.216]
0.204
[0.197,0.211]
0.192
[0.185,0.199]
0.182
[0.176,0.188]
fq2 0.235
[0.228,0.242]
0.216
[0.209,0.224]
0.206
[0.199,0.214]
0.182
[0.175,0.190]
0.161
[0.155,0.167]
fq3 0.203
[0.196,0.210]
0.223
[0.216,0.230]
0.229
[0.222,0.237]
0.197
[0.190,0.204]
0.148
[0.142,0.155]
fq4 0.177
[0.171,0.185]
0.195
[0.188,0.202]
0.206
[0.198,0.213]
0.215
[0.208,0.222]
0.207
[0.200,0.214]
fq5 0.177
[0.171,0.184]
0.159
[0.153,0.165]
0.155
[0.148,0.161]
0.211
[0.204,0.218]
0.298
[0.291,0.305]
Finland (n = 5749)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.255
[0.231,0.280]
0.186
[0.161,0.211]
0.229
[0.203,0.253]
0.182
[0.160,0.207]
0.148
[0.127,0.169]
fq2 0.206
[0.183,0.229]
0.246
[0.221,0.271]
0.192
[0.167,0.218]
0.201
[0.176,0.225]
0.156
[0.135,0.179]
fq3 0.182
[0.159,0.207]
0.205
[0.177,0.233]
0.217
[0.190,0.241]
0.222
[0.197,0.248]
0.174
[0.150,0.198]
fq4 0.188
[0.164,0.213]
0.190
[0.165,0.215]
0.200
[0.178,0.223]
0.198
[0.174,0.223]
0.223
[0.200,0.248]
fq5 0.167
[0.144,0.191]
0.172
[0.151,0.193]
0.165
[0.142,0.187]
0.195
[0.170,0.218]
0.301
[0.275,0.326]
Norway (n = 26838)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.243
[0.233,0.254]
0.207
[0.196,0.217]
0.203
[0.193,0.214]
0.200
[0.190,0.210]
0.147
[0.137,0.156]
fq2 0.211
[0.201,0.221]
0.231
[0.221,0.241]
0.221
[0.211,0.231]
0.193
[0.183,0.204]
0.143
[0.134,0.153]
fq3 0.196
[0.187,0.206]
0.204
[0.193,0.215]
0.212
[0.202,0.222]
0.201
[0.190,0.211]
0.186
[0.176,0.196]
fq4 0.181
[0.171,0.191]
0.190
[0.180,0.200]
0.202
[0.191,0.212]
0.215
[0.204,0.225]
0.212
[0.203,0.222]
fq5 0.168
[0.158,0.177]
0.167
[0.158,0.177]
0.162
[0.152,0.172]
0.191
[0.182,0.202]
0.311
[0.299,0.322]
Sweden (n = 32209)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.244
[0.235,0.254]
0.214
[0.206,0.223]
0.210
[0.200,0.221]
0.186
[0.178,0.196]
0.145
[0.137,0.153]
fq2 0.213
[0.204,0.223]
0.214
[0.205,0.224]
0.220
[0.210,0.230]
0.207
[0.198,0.216]
0.146
[0.137,0.154]
fq3 0.195
[0.186,0.205]
0.203
[0.194,0.213]
0.210
[0.201,0.219]
0.216
[0.206,0.225]
0.175
[0.166,0.184]
fq4 0.180
[0.170,0.189]
0.195
[0.186,0.205]
0.203
[0.193,0.213]
0.204
[0.195,0.213]
0.218
[0.208,0.228]
fq5 0.166
[0.157,0.174]
0.171
[0.163,0.180]
0.154
[0.145,0.162]
0.189
[0.181,0.199]
0.320
[0.310,0.330]
UK (n = 2348)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.232
[0.193,0.266]
0.226
[0.190,0.262]
0.198
[0.163,0.235]
0.183
[0.149,0.219]
0.162
[0.129,0.195]
fq2 0.211
[0.179,0.246]
0.249
[0.212,0.284]
0.185
[0.151,0.220]
0.181
[0.150,0.213]
0.174
[0.140,0.211]
fq3 0.224
[0.190,0.260]
0.164
[0.126,0.203]
0.232
[0.198,0.265]
0.192
[0.156,0.228]
0.188
[0.154,0.222]
fq4 0.200
[0.170,0.233]
0.209
[0.174,0.243]
0.194
[0.157,0.227]
0.226
[0.193,0.261]
0.172
[0.139,0.204]
fq5 0.134
[0.105,0.165]
0.154
[0.118,0.190]
0.190
[0.156,0.223]
0.220
[0.183,0.255]
0.303
[0.265,0.341]
USNLSY (n = 1834)
Daughter
Father oq1 oq2 oq3 oq4 oq5
fq1 0.258
[0.206,0.313]
0.213
[0.159,0.268]
0.251
[0.193,0.307]
0.184
[0.136,0.235]
0.094
[0.064,0.133]
fq2 0.169
[0.114,0.222]
0.223
[0.163,0.283]
0.228
[0.171,0.286]
0.209
[0.157,0.261]
0.170
[0.120,0.226]
fq3 0.167
[0.116,0.224]
0.259
[0.196,0.330]
0.233
[0.175,0.299]
0.162
[0.106,0.217]
0.178
[0.126,0.233]
fq4 0.188
[0.133,0.253]
0.184
[0.129,0.243]
0.170
[0.111,0.231]
0.219
[0.163,0.274]
0.240
[0.181,0.300]
fq5 0.220
[0.168,0.274]
0.122
[0.078,0.172]
0.125
[0.075,0.178]
0.220
[0.165,0.277]
0.313
[0.250,0.383]
Note: Tese results include all father-offspring pairs, i.e., even those with zero earnings. The numbers in brackets below the point estimates show the bias corrected 95 percent
bootstrap confidence interval.
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